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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has revolutionized how society interacts with,
and via, technology. Though some early detractors criticized the
"cloud" as being nothing more than an empty industry buzzword, we
contend that by dovetailing communications and calculating pro-
cesses for the first time in history, cloud computing is--both practi-
cally and legally-a shift in prevailing paradigms. As a practical
matter, the cloud brings with it a previously undreamt-of sense of lo-
cation independence for both suppliers and consumers. And legally,
the shift toward deploying computing ability as a service, rather than
as a product, represents an evolution to a contractual foundation
for interacting.
Already, substantive cloud-based disputes have erupted in a vare-
ty of legal fields, including personal privacy, intellectual property,
and antitrust, to name a few. Yet before courts can confront such
issues, they must first address the two fundamental procedural ques-
tions of a lawsuit that form the bases of this Article-whether any
law applies in the cloud, and, if so, which law ought to apply.
Drawing upon novel analyses of analogous Internet jurisprudence,
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as well as concepts borrowed from disciplines ranging from econom-
ics to anthropology, this Article seeks to supply answers to these ques-
tions. To do so, we first identify a set of normative goals that juris-
dictional and choice-of-law methodologies ought to achieve in the
unique context of cloud computing. With these goals in mind, we
then lay out structured analytical guidelines and suggested policy re-
forms to guide the continued development of jurisdiction and choice
of law in the cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
[A] time may come, and may not be far distant, when commercial
aircraft will fly at altitudes so high that it would be unrealistic to
consider them as being within the territorial limits of the United
States or of any particular State while flying at such altitudes.'
We have come a long way in the more than half-century since
Grace v. MacArthur was decided. Today, in record-setting fashion,
even humans are surpassing commercial aircraft in altitude.' And
with the ever-increasing use of cellular and wireless technologies, data
is now, more than ever, being sent through and stored in the air-
waves--or clouds.3 A different type of "cloud," however, has taken
center stage in this new era of data transfer and storage: cloud com-
puting. Although a healthy debate surrounds its precise definition,
cloud computing, put simply, is the ability of an end user to store and
1. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
2. On October 14, 2012, Austrian Felix Baumgartner freefell 128,100 feet-more
than twenty-four miles-to Earth from a space capsule. John Tierney, 24 Miles, 4 Minutes
and 834 M.PH., All in One Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/felix-baumgartner-skydiving.html?_r=0. The
stunt was part of the Red Bull Stratos project to gather new data about the human body
and test new materials at extreme altitudes. Id. On his descent, Baumgartner achieved a
maximum speed of 833.9 miles per hour, or Mach 1.24. Id.
3. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Allocating Radio Spectrum for the "Mobile Data Tsunami," 13
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAc. GRoUPS 82, 82-84 (2012) (noting the "looming spec-
trum shortage" and spectrum "crowding" due to the proliferation of wireless data).
4. As one commentator noted humorously, "[a]ttempting to define cloud computing
can prove to be as elusive as attempting to capture a genuine cloud with one's hands."
David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v.
Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (ANNUAL REVIEW) 621, 638 (2010); see also infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing the public's misconceptions about cloud
computing).
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access remotely located files and services over a network by means of a
smart phone, computer, tablet, or other networked device.5
The advent of cloud computing brought with it myriad novel le-
gal challenges pertaining to, inter alia, privacy concerns, intellectual
property rights, and antitrust violations.! And as is common with new
technologies, the continuing scientific development of cloud compu-
ting is outpacing its legal counterpart, at least for now.7 But as courts'
decisions regarding the substantive law of cloud computing attempt
to keep stride with the underlying technology,8 critical procedural
questions can sometimes be overlooked.9 This Article grapples with
the two fundamental questions of procedure-where personal jurisdic-
tion is proper and what law governs a dispute-and endeavors to provide
structured frameworks for analyzing them. The answer to these ques-
tions can oftentimes exert an even greater influence over a lawsuit's
outcome than its substantive merits,"' for equally as important as what
the law says is which law applies, and where it does so."
To illustrate the intersection of cloud technology and the law,
imagine a manmade floating island, anchored at sea or in a river, up-
5. William J. Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1202 (2010). For a more detailed explanation of
the origins and mechanics of cloud computing, see infra Part II.C.
6. See infra notes 81-83 (providing examples of cases in which cloud-based compu-
ting issues were litigated).
7. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REv. 553, 566 (1998) ("[T]hat technological developments
outpace the rate of legal change poses another particular problem for intellectual proper-
ty rights; the law always lags behind the technology."); see also Edward Lee, Rules and Stand-
ards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1318 (2002) ("The Internet is fast devel-
oping and continues to outpace the law.").
8. See Lee, supra note 7, at 1318 (describing the challenges courts confront in resolv-
ing cases presenting issues with regard to cyberspace).
9. See Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property Law: An In-
terdisciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 106 (2008)
("Certainly, when intellectual property disputes touch on other disciplines, such as civil
procedure ... courts have tended to overlook their synergies, focusing instead on only one
of several important policies or principles. The result has gone beyond missed opportuni-
ties. It has led to judicial mistakes . . . .").
10. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action,
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 719, 745 & n.130 (2009) ("Which state's law applies can determine the
litigation outcome.").
11. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice-of-Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 992-93 (1994) ("[Clourts recognize that procedural requirements perform an
essential function in any legal system .... Hence, substance is not all; courts and adminis-
trators recognize that substantive results must be balanced against the harm to the system
that would result if procedures were entirely ignored.").
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on which computer servers are aggregated. The buoyant structure
can be moved about the body of water as needed-for example, to
provide computer and telecommunications support to an area affect-
ed by a natural disaster-and the servers are powered and cooled by
the motion (wave, tidal, or current) of the water in which the struc-
ture floats. Too futuristic or unrealistic? Not for technology behe-
moth Google, Inc., which was granted a patent for such a data center
in 2009.12
In industry terms, Google's patent describes a mobile, marine-
based server farm." The advantages of such a server farm include,
among others, a zero-cost power supply and the ability to move the
servers within close proximity of the end users who interact with
them.14 In addition to these economic and functional considerations,
however, there are substantial legal consequences to this arrange-
ment. For example, a server farm that is located both everywhere and
nowhere, essentially,'5 allows users to conduct network activities that
might otherwise be regulated heavily-or even prohibited-by the na-
tional laws of the country where a land-based server is located. 16
Query, then, if a lawsuit were to arise based on content hosted by
a marine-based server like the one described in Google's patent,
where would jurisdiction be proper? In Delaware, where Google is
incorporated? In California, where Google has its principal place of
business? Or elsewhere? And equally as important, if a court can hear
the case, what law governs? To the extent that these questions remain
unanswered, they are especially troubling because cloud-computing
service providers often retain copies of uploaded content in multiple
12. Water-Based Data Center, U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued
Apr. 28, 2009); Ashlee Vance, Google's Search Goes Out to Sea, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Sept. 7,
2008, 9:59 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/googles-search-goes-out-to-
sea/.
13. See Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International
Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 714 (2011) ("[A] server is a computer designed to provide in-
formation or processes to other computers on a network, and a server farm, also known as
a data center, is a group of servers in one location connected by a network.").
14. See id. at 716-17.
15. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997) ("The Internet has no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far
as the Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps 'no there there,' the 'there' is eve-
rywhere where there is Internet access.").
16. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 718 (noting, in particular, that "[g] ambling or por-
nography websites could ... escape scrutiny by running floating sites" and highlighting
some countries' laws that ban certain Internet activities).
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locations or, at the opposite end of spectrum, fragment data across
17
numerous servers.
This Article seeks to answer these questions. Part II traces the
history of data storage and data transfer prior to the dawn of cloud
computing, with particular emphases on content reproduction, com-
munication technology, and computing capability;' it also provides a
technological overview of cloud computing and the legal contours in
which it exists." Part III then summarizes personal-jurisdiction and
choice-of-law jurisprudence." Part III also sets forth the normative
goals that this Article seeks to achieve by evaluating the interplay be-
tween predictability and innovation and discussing the economic im-
pacts of new technologies."
Parts IV and V then lay out frameworks for analyzing personal ju-
risdiction and choice of law in cloud-computing cases. These Parts
each begin by examining decisions from Internet-era cases and
demonstrating that cloud computing presents issues of personal ju-
risdiction and choice of law that are distinct from cases involving reg-
ular Internet interactions, that is, operating or accessing a website.
By recognizing this contrast, Parts IV and V explain the reasons why
the Internet-law approach to personal jurisdiction and choice of law is
not only legally incongruous with cloud computing, but also unwork-
able in practice. Parts IV and V then offer a series of solutions-both
judicial and legislative-for addressing these cloud-computing co-
nundrums in personal jurisdiction and choice of law.
Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion. In sum, this Article ex-
poses the hazards of attempting to apply traditional personal-
jurisdiction and choice-of-law doctrines to novel situations that arise
in cloud-computing interactions. By acknowledging the need to de-
part from these conventional frameworks, this Article offers solutions
that accommodate the recent developments in technology and illu-
minate a path for courts and legislatures to follow when addressing
the intricacies raised by these two fundamental procedural questions.
17. Josiah Dykstra & Damien Richl, Forensic Collection of Evidence from Infrastructure-as-a-
Service Cloud Computing, 19 RICH.J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2012).
18. See infra Part II.A-B.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part III.A-B.
21. See infra Part III.B.4.
22. See infra Parts IVA, V.A.
23. See infra Parts IV.B, V.B.
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II. FROM COURIER TO CLOUD: THE EVOLUTION AND CONVERGENCE OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTING
The central thesis of what follows is simple. Prior to the advent
of cloud computing, humankind's ability to communicate and to cal-
culate (and later to compute) developed on separate tracks. The shift
to the cloud is the bridging of that millennia-old gap. In short, cloud
computing constitutes the first dovetailing of communication and cal-
culation. Thus, we contend that the advent of cloud computing rep-
resents a true paradigm shift 4 in the way that both suppliers and con-
sumers interact with digital technology-it is a shift away from viewing
computing capability as a product and toward deploying and consum-
ing it as a service.
As with any disruptive leap forward in technology that ultimately
alters real-space behavior, the move to the cloud carries with it impli-
cations for the administration of legal systems and the application of
existing laws." The first step toward exploring those implications is
gaining an understanding of the technology itself; accordingly, this
Part begins by recounting the developments in information technolo-
gy that paved the way for cloud computing. We turn first to what we
term the "Pre-Network Era"-a period that spans the roughly seven-
and-a-half millennia predating the rise of the Internet.
A. The Pre-Network Era
The marketplace transactions, political structures, and legal
mechanisms of ancient civilizations eventually grew too complex to
manage using only human memory and oral communication. Inno-
vations provided the means to overcome these limitations-as to
communicative data storage and transfer, writing emerged; as to cal-
culating ability, the abacus was developed. Yet, from the earliest sym-
bols etched into clay pottery or cave walls to the first books printed
24. The term "paradigm shift" originated in Thomas Kuhn's seminal work The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn employed it to describe a dramatic change in the prevail-
ing theory underlying a field of scientific study. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 84-85 (2d ed. 1970). It has subsequently entered the popular
lexicon as a phrase more loosely describing any major change in political, social, artistic,
or commercial structures, and it is in this latter sense that we use the term here.
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
26. See David Whitehouse, 'Earliest Writing' Found, BBCNEWS (May 4, 1999),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/334517.stm ("The first known examples of
writing may have been unearthed at an archaeological dig in Pakistan.... [T]hese primi-
tive inscriptions found on pottery may pre-date all other known writing.").
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more than six millennia later using Gutenberg's movable-type print-
ing press2 7 to the millions of copies of mass-market hardcover and pa-
perback books still being printed today, content storage and transfer
occurred within remarkably static structures. Communication tech-
nology also marginally improved but, overall, remained fairly static.
Similarly, calculating (and later computing) remained-in at least
some ways-a relatively stable technology from 2000 B.C. to the late
twentieth century.
As to content, the most readily apparent counterargument to our
thesis is that the Gutenberg Press radically changed reproduction, dis-
tribution, and consumption. It is certainly true that by greatly reduc-
ing variable costs, the invention of the printing press dramatically al-
tered the economics of textual production.2 8 Thus, where "there were
perhaps 30,000 books in all of Europe before Gutenberg printed his
Bible; less than 50 years later, there were as many as 10 to 12 million
books."2  But even as it evolved from scratching in clay pots to using
quill pens and vellum to printing multiple sheets from a single page
of movable type, authorship and reproduction throughout most of
human history consisted of physically fixing data in "a tangible medi-
um of expression," to borrow a phrase from modern U.S. copyright
law.o And "tangible" meant media that were physical. The movable-
type press made books inexpensive to reproduce, but it did not elimi-
nate conditions of scarcity.3 1 It allowed a single operator to create
hundreds of copies of texts, but it did not change the localized, physi-
cal nature of (re)production."2  It made printed materials more af-
fordable, but did nothing transformative to distribution; that is, the
27. This press, it should be noted, may or may not have been the first movable-type
press, and those "first books" may or may not have been Bibles-a healthy historical debate
surrounds such claims, thankfully one far beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., PETER
L. SHILLINGSBURG, FROM GUTENBERG TO GOOGLE: ELECTRONIc REPRESENTATIONS OF
LITERARY TEXTS 28 (2006).
28. Seejeremiah Dittmar, Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the
Printing Press, 126 Q.J. ECON. 1133, 1140 (2011) (comparing the benefits derived from the
invention of the printing press in cities with and without printing presses).
29. Gutenberg's Legacy, HARRY RANSOM CTR., UNIV. OFTEX.,
http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/educator/modules/gutenberg/books/legacy/ (last visited
May 30, 2013).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
31. See Dittmar, supra note 28, at 1140 (describing the limitations to obtaining print
media in cities that did not have printing presses).
32. See id. (explaining that "[p]rint media were costly to transport because they were
heavy and fragile commodities").
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end products still had to travel via the exact same real-space channels
as handmade copies. 3 Finally, end users consumed and stored data
produced by the Gutenberg Press just as they had for thousands of
years; the only difference was that exponentially more of them were
able to do so.
Even the digitization of content in the twentieth century did not,
by itself, bring much structural change to production, distribution,
and consumption. Before digital computers were networked, their
ability to produce thousands of perfect copies at marginal costs ap-
proaching zero was superfluous.3 ' An individual in her own home
could produce localized copies of content, but had no use for the
surplus." This was so because distribution-as it had been following
the introduction of the Gutenberg Press-remained largely un-
changed. And as a result, consumption structures and processes re-
mained relatively static as well.
A somewhat stronger counterargument could be made as to
communications technology. Here, the focal points would likely be
the emergence of pre-digital networks like the telegraph or analog
telephone systems or, alternatively, the development of wireless
broadcast (or wired narrowcast) systems. By alleviating at least some
of the geographic-locality limitations on human communications,
these developments were indeed innovative." Yet again, we argue
that these were-as a structural matter-less revolutionary than they
might seem at first glance. These systems were beset by one of the
same fundamental problems as face-to-face communication: engaging
in two- or multiple-way communications dictated a relatively limited
number of participants; as that number expanded, communication
necessarily became one-way." Put another way, in a real-space, local-
ized setting, a multiple-way conversation can only occur between a
33. See LUCIAN FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK 115-17
(Geoffrey Nowel-Smith & David Wootton, eds., 1976) (discussing the importance to early
publishers of being located along established trade routes).
34. SeeJohn M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 11), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2138409 ("The intangibility of code, coupled with years of expo-
nential growth in processing speeds and hard drive capacity, allowed for nearly instanta-
neous, high-quality copying that entailed marginal costs approaching zero.").
35. Id. at 11-12.
36. See generally Cory Ondrejka, Collapsing Geography: Second Life, Innovation, and the Fu-
ture of National Power, 2 INNOvATIONS 27 (2007) (discussing the interplay between innova-
tion and geography).
37. See id.
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very limited number of participants. Expanding this number soon
requires changing the format to a one-way communication from an
active speaker to a passive audience. And the advent of telegraphs,
telephones, and wireless broadcast radio and television did nothing to
change that.
As to computing, our claim that the digital computer in some
ways represented little change from the abacus might seem downright
heretical.3 s Admittedly, the digital computer has represented a quan-
tum leap forward in calculating ability-and the subsequent exponen-
tial growth in processing capability shows no signs of slowing." But,
until very recently, humans interacted with computing devices much
as they had with earlier calculators. Computing was a localized pro-
cess-a user needed to physically and locally interact with the ma-
chine that would perform the processes she input.4 ' And consumers
of computing power generally were required to purchase physical
machines. In short, computing was viewed as a product, rather than a
service. All of this meant that digital computers were structurally quite
similar to pre-digital calculating devices.
Certainly, the advances mentioned above that emerged during
the Pre-Network Era brought with them great upheavals in social,
economic, political, and legal processes. They were disruptive innova-
tions in every sense of the word; they wreaked the sort of "creative de-
struction" upon entrenched markets that Schumpeter famously iden-
tified.41 But in recent decades, we have been-and are currently-
38. Cf, e.g., Rocco L. Martino, Innovation and Economic Growth: Lessons from the Story of
ENWIAC, FOOTNOTES (Foreign Policy Research Institute), Apr. 2009, at 1, available at
https://www.fpri.org/docs/FN1406-martino-eniac.pdf (describing the advent of the "Elec-
tronic Numerical Integrator and Computer" as a symbol of "radical, incremental, and rev-
olutionary innovations ... the grandfather of the computer and of the information trans-
formation of our world").
39. "Moore's Law" was coined to describe the rapid pace of growth in processing ca-
pability over the previous two decades. INTEL, MOORE'S LAW (2005),
ftp://download.intel.com/sites/channel/museum/Moores-Law/Printed-Materials/Moor
esLaw_2pg.pdf ("Nearly 40 years ago, Intel co-founder Gordon Moore forecasted the rap-
id pace of technology innovation.").
40. See David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure 3.0, 17 VA.J.L.
& TECH. 190, 209 (2012) ("[A] user of traditional word-processing software such as Word
or an email application such as Outlook runs these programs off her own machine, using
local processing power and data storage facilities.").
41. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (Harper &
Row 3d ed. 1950) (1942) (describing innovations that "incessantly revolutionize[] the
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a
new one").
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experiencing paradigm shifts in content economics, communications
technology, and computing capability that rival in magnitude the sum
of innovative activity from the last seven-and-a-half millenia combined.
B. The Internet: A Network of Networks
The Internet-a "network of networks" and the "printing press of
the technology era"4 -provided the communication platform upon
which content digitization and increasing computing capability could
interact in a truly revolutionary way. Widespread access to the Inter-
net at constantly increasing speeds did to data distribution what digit-
ization and access to personal computers had done to reproduction: it
lowered marginal costs to essentially zero.4 ' The importance of the
dawn of the Network Era for content, communication, and now com-
puting, cannot be overstated."
Without connectivity, advances in computing were fairly irrele-
vant to the structural processes in place for the production, distribu-
tion, and consumption of communicative content. Before the Net-
work Era, a single end user could feasibly have created millions of
copies of an ebook on her home computer, but the duplicates would
have been relegated to isolated storage as wasted surplusage.4 ' Firms
and individuals were able to create content digitally-for example,
newspaper reporters were able to write articles using word-processing
programs-but distribution either required slow, costly physical
means or was shackled by the limitations of broad- or narrowcasting
discussed above.
But networking not only represented a drastic reduction in the
costs of communication, it also eliminated the relevance of geograph-
ic location to distribution capability and costs. By removing the phys-
ical element from reproduction and distribution, it upended the old
42. Joshua C. Ramo & David S. Jackson, Winner Take All, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 56, 63
(quotingJames Barksdale, President and CEO of Netscape).
43. Cf John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 681, 694 (2012) ("Digital products can be reproduced extremely cheaply, often
with marginal costs approaching zero.").
44. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 67, 68 (2010) ("The Internet unquestionably represents one of the most important
technological developments in recent history. It has revolutionized the way people com-
municate with one another and obtain information and has created an unimaginable vari-
ety of commercial and leisure activities.").
45. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
46. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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localized model such that content could be made available to anyone,
anywhere, and could be distributed to them at the speed of light.4 7
For the first time, not only ideas themselves, but now their embodi-
ments as well, were truly nonrivalrous. Content abundance replaced
content scarcity."
Finally, the adoption of the Internet deconstructed the hierarchy
of production. In place of top-down models arose end-to-end archi-
tecture that rendered the traditional concept of "end users" an oxy-
moron.4 9 Former pure consumers became producers and distributors
as well."o And the rise of nearly instantaneous, zero-cost, two-way
transfer of media created an avenue and demand for multipath, large-
scale communication.5 1 The ability to effectively converse with thou-
sands of individuals allowed previously undreamt-of communicative
possibilities. A single person's blog posting could create a conversa-
tion that spread throughout a network of networks, seemingly with a
life of its own-as the neologism aptly puts it, "virally."
The transformative shift to the Network Era has not been an easy
one. In its infant stages, legal and political battles erupted over the
application of standing laws and norms to the human interactions oc-
curring atop this new platform. Myriad questions regarding owner-
ship, agreements, morality, intellectual property, privacy, and other
47. Cf Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1013, 1074-75 (2008) (highlighting the legal challenges resulting from globalization,
which include "the complexities of gathering intelligence from telephone and internet
communications transmitted in and out of the United States and around the world at the
speed of light").
48. See Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media
Networks, 24 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 111, 153 (2010) (referring to "the world of content abun-
dance").
49. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIvHrY 8 (2004).
50. See Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, 45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 141 (2012)
("Web 2.0 was defined as an 'amalgam of 'participatory Web' applications,' which turned
erstwhile passive end users into active producers by allowing them to generate and share
content of all types.").
51. Id. at 141-42 (explaining that the "decentralization of the Web .. . empowered the
Internet to operate as a platform rather than a mere data conduit," leading to the advent
of widespread sharing services such as "blogs, wikis, [and other social media websites]").
52. See, e.g., Bryce A. Lenox, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the Stream
of Commerce Dog New Internet Tricks: Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996), 22 U. DAYrON L. REv. 331, 332 (1997) ( "Because of the youth and novelty of the
Internet, jurisdictional issues are only now beginning to surface in the courts.").
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issues remain unresolved." And the next stage of development, de-
scribed below, will raise yet even more questions in need of answers.
C. Rising into the Cloud
The American public remains largely ignorant as to what, exactly,
"cloud computing" is. A majority, in fact, appear to believe it has
something to do with actual clouds and that, consequently, a severe
squall or thunderstorm could fatally disrupt cloud-computing pro-
cesses.14 Given the difficulty that even industry experts have in formu-
lating a precise definition of "cloud computing,"" this confusion is
understandable. Yet the fact is that the majority of computer and
smartphone users already consume cloud services on a daily (even
hourly) basis." Web-based email, calendars, spreadsheet editors, and
word-processing programs like the current offerings from Google,
Microsoft, and others are all examples of cloud-computing services al-
ready in common use." Without knowing what the term denotes, it
seems, society has already begun rising into the cloud.
Jurisprudence, however, does not have that luxury. Before courts
can adjudicate disputes that arise in the cloud, they must understand
what cloud computing is, how it differs from previous architectures,
and what implications those differences carry for jurisdiction and
choice of law.
53. Cf., e.g., Amelia Rawls, Contract Fornation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SC. & TECH.
L. REv. 200, 204 (2009) (discussing how, in particular, "modernity has induced transfor-
mations even in seemingly traditional applications of contract law"). But see Lenox, supra
note 52, at 331-32 (stating that some "cyber-issues," including "pornography on the Inter-
net, copyright law, and libel have been addressed in great detail").
54. Zach Walton, Americans Think Cloud Computing Comes from Actual Clouds,
WEBPRONEWs (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/americans-think-cloud-
computing-comes-from-actual-clouds-2012-08 (discussing the results of a survey of 1,000
Americans which showed that "51 percent of respondents believe [d] that stormy weather
[could] interfere with cloud computing" and only "16 percent actually knew what the
cloud was").
55. See, e.g., Miranda Mowbray, The Fog over the Grimpen Mire: Cloud Computing and the
Law, 6 SCRIPTED 133, 134 (2009) ("[Tlhere is no agreed upon definition of cloud com-
puting."); Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud-Whatever
That May Mean, WALL ST.J., Mar. 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123802623665542725.html ("While almost everybody in the tech industry seems to have
a cloud-themed project, few agree on the term's definition.").
56. See Walton, supra note 54 (describing survey results revealing that ninety-five per-
cent of the respondents used cloud-based services daily).
57. See Lametti, supra note 40, at 209 (identifying Google Docs, Microsoft Office Live,
and Gmail as "Cloud-based application [s]").
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More than a few skeptics have posited that "cloud computing" is
nothing more than a redundant buzzword, synonymous and coexten-
sive with the Internet. 5  It is our aim in the following Part not only to
provide a high-level understanding of the evolution and structure of
cloud-computing processes, but also to reply to such skepticism.
Cloud services exhibit unique technological and legal features that
will require specialized analyses. In short, cloud computing-though
it shares some similarities with, and frequently leverages the commu-
nicative capabilities of, the Internet-is not an empty concept.
1. Technological Structure
The most commonly cited description of cloud computing is the
National Institute of Standards and Technology's ("NIST") definition:
"a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources ... that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management
effort or service provider interaction."" Put another way, cloud com-
puting is a model that allows for on-demand "scalability" of compu-
ting power by end users that are located remotely from the compu-
ting resources themselves.o The NIST definition goes on to list five
attributes of cloud computing: (1) on-demand self-service, (2) broad
network access, (3) resource pooling, (4) rapid elasticity or expan-
sion, and (5) measured service." Essentially, cloud-service providers
make a pool of servers available to distributed end users who can rap-
idly harness those servers' collective computing power when needed
("scaling up"), then rapidly release that power when the desired task
is completed ("scaling down") .
Cloud computing also allows "workload migration"-service pro-
viders can easily shift workloads across servers, both inside local data
58. See, e.g., Warren B. Chik, Paying It Forward: The Case for a Specfic Statutory Limitation
on Exclusive Rights for User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 240, 244 (2011) ("There is no consensus on the definition of 'Web 2.0' or
even that it is anything more than a buzzword.").
59. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NIST, SP 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF
CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011).
60. See, e.g., Cindy Pham, Note, E-Discovery in the Cloud Era: What's a Litigant to Do?, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 139, 142 (2013) ("[C]loud computing is an Internet-based ser-
vice which provides users access to software, resources, and information stored elsewhere
and managed by someone else, anytime and anywhere.").
61. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2.
62. See Pham, supra note 60, at 139-40 ("[C]loud computing ... can be scaled to indi-
vidual needs.").
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centers and among disparately located data centers.6 And this, in
turn, allows suppliers to route around any single server (or, frequent-
ly, even an entire data center) in case of technical failure, to allow for
scheduled maintenance, or even to avoid consuming expensive peak-
demand power in a certain geographic region. This resiliency and
flexibility offers readily apparent advantages over traditional compu-
ting models for both producers and consumers.
The move to the cloud is a move away from consuming compu-
ting resources as a product and toward viewing computing as a ser-
vice.65  From the consumer's perspective, cloud services generally
eliminate the geographic location of hardware (other than the con-
sumer's own thin-client hardware") as a relevant aspect of computing.
So long as a network connection exists, the physical location of end
users, servers, and service providers-and their proximity to one an-
other-is almost entirely irrelevant (at least outside a courtroom). A
U.S. citizen could, for example, use a smartphone to check her email
from La Guardia airport in New York, edit a document from a desk-
top computer at a kiosk during a layover in Reykjavik, Iceland, and
then schedule a calendar appointment using her laptop from a hotel
in Vienna, Austria. And regardless of her physical location, the actual
computations she was directing could have been occurring on a server
located anywhere on Earth. As the NIST definition puts it, "[t] here is
a sense of location independence in that the customer generally has
no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided re-
63. T. Sridhar, Cloud Computing-A Prumer: Part 1: Models and Technologies, 12 INTERNET
PROTOCOLJ. 2, 3 (2009) (defining "[w]orkload movement" by cloud-computing providers
as "migrat[ing] workloads across servers-both inside the data center and across data cen-
ters").
64. See, e.g., Xuan Li & Jine-Chung Lo, Pricing and Peak Aware Scheduling Algorithm for
Cloud Computing, 2012 IEEE 1 (2012).
65. Accordingly, "[c] loud computing involves shifting the bulk of the costs from capi-
tal expenditures ... to an operating expense... model, where you pay for usage of these types
of resources." Sridhar, supra note 63, at 3.
66. The term "thin client" refers to the advent, made possible by cloud technologies,
of end-user devices with relatively little local computing capacity. See, e.g., Lametti, supra
note 40, at 219 ("We are entering a period where 'thin clients' are becoming the norm.
These are devices with little computing capacity or need to perform computing functions
on their own."). A smartphone, for example, may have far less computing ability than a
laptop or desktop computer-yet, by virtue of Internet connectivity and cloud services, an
end-user with a smartphone can now harness far greater computing and storage capacity
than a peer using an unconnected desktop computer.
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sources."" Indeed, the term "location independence" has been used
elsewhere with some frequency to describe the phenomenon of the
geographic irrelevance of computing resources in the cloud.
From the supplier's perspective, cloud computing's exact effect
on the relevance of server location varies depending on each suppli-
er's particular practices. Take, for example, Google's email service.
Because Google actually owns its massive server farms, it can affirma-
tively choose to migrate workloads among its own servers from state to
state, country to country, or even land to sea-in the case of offshore
servers-to realize gains from whatever comparative advantages can
be had in the new location. To the extent Google does so, geograph-
ic location of servers remains relevant (at least to Google, if not to
consumers or advertisers) because, in this scenario, Google has made
affirmative, purposeful choices regarding the geographic location of
the server farms handling workloads. By way of contrast, consider a
firm offering a competing service that runs over metered service pur-
chased from Amazon's cloud-services arm. Here, the service provider
may-like its consumers-be indifferent as to the geographic location
of the actual computing power Amazon is providing. Alternatively,
cloud-services contracts sometimes specify a large geographic zone
encompassing multiple server farms within which migration can oc-
cur.69 To the extent that some real-space limitations are contemplat-
ed, geographic location of servers thus can remain salient to varying
degrees.
Regardless of the exact circumstances, the importance to service
providers of computers' actual geographic location is-from a tech-
nological standpoint-relatively minimal. This is so because, at its
core, cloud computing consists of offering computing resources "that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort
or service provider interaction."'o If this were not the case, many of the
67. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2. As the NIST noted, of course, customers still
"may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (for example, country,
state, or datacenter)." Id.
68. See, e.g., Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and Analysis of the
Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, Queen Mary University of London, School
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 63/2010 (Sept. 1, 2010), at 5 ("Location inde-
pendence means, from the customer's perspective, that the services can be accessed from
anywhere with suitable communications links.").
69. See id. at 28 (noting that "[s]ome major cloud providers ... have made a point of
offering 'regional zones' in which a customer may be assured that data will remain").
70. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2 (emphasis added).
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efficiencies offered by cloud services would disappear. Location in-
dependence is an important-even crucial-aspect of cloud compu-
ting for providers as well as customers.
2. Legal Structure
From a legal perspective, the cloud embodies a new template for
interactions: all interactions in the cloud-unlike those that occur
purely via the Internet-are contract-based. Previously, a consumer
who purchased a computer had little or no ongoing contractual rela-
tionship with the supplier. When computing was a product, consum-
ers purchased and consumed it locally like any other off-the-shelf
good. Similarly, visiting a passive Web 1.0-type website generally does
not trigger any ongoing contractual relationship." Computing as a
service, however, is an entirely different matter. Like any contract for
services, the provision and consumption of cloud-computing services
contemplates a contractual relationship that continues as long as the
service is being provided. Consider, for example, an individual con-
sumer using a cloud-based word-processing application. For as long
as she utilizes the application, that consumer is interacting with a
supplier under the terms of a contract-a contract for the perfor-
mance of services-in a way that an individual visiting a passive Web
1.0 website is not.
3. Welfare Gains from Cloud Adoption
It nearly goes without saying that scalability in computing pro-
vides multiple benefits to suppliers and consumers, increasing both
total and consumer welfare. Greater resiliency and location inde-
pendence represent increases in computing quality relative to pre-
cloud products. Cost and price advantages are present as well. On
the demand side, consumers of computing services generally exhibit
variable demand; that is, they require different amounts of computing
71. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 5 ("Location independence is also an im-
portant factor for providers, who may seek to deploy their infrastructure wherever it is
most convenient and efficient, and in a manner that maximises the economies of scale al-
ready mentioned.").
72. See Lev-Aretz, supra note 50, at 141 ("Under the Web 1.0 stage, the Web func-
tioned as a read-only medium through numerous 'static' websites.").
73. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 15-16 (surveying terms and conditions con-
tracts for cloud services and concluding that "[i]t is not unusual to see a provision that the
contract will continue indefinitely until it is terminated").
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power at different times. Yet consumers who opt to use cloud-
computing services can purchase only the computing services they ac-
tually use, instead of being forced to purchase enough capacity to
meet maximum demand.7 5 Relatedly, shifting computing purchases
to the cloud allows customers to transform the outlays incurred from
capital expenditures, which are front-loaded, to operating expendi-
tures, which are more evenly distributed. On the supply side, pro-
viders of cloud services can attain economies of scale "by sharing re-
sources between a pool of customers and buying infrastructure in
bulk."" These reduced costs, assuming that the provider is operating
in a competitive market, may then be passed on to consumers in the
78form of lower prices.
4. Legal Implications
The shift to cloud computing, like any other major technological
upheaval, has not been-and will not be-entirely free of legal obsta-
cles. Cloud-computing models have been rapidly adopted by provid-
ers and users,7 a transition spurred on by the efficiencies noted
above.80 These benefits have not come without a price, however.
Sprawling legal disputes have already arisen out of cloud-based inter-
actions in substantive areas ranging from personal privacy," to copy-
74. Id. at 5.
75. Mowbray, supra note 55, at 145-46 ("For buyers, one advantage of using cloud
computing, as opposed to buying all the hardware and software necessary to meet their
computing needs, is that they only need to pay for the computing services that they actual-
ly use.").
76. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 3 (describing the transformation of capital
expenditures to operating expenditures).
77. Id. It should be noted that, as to a private cloud (owned and operated internally
by one firm), the "pool-of-customers" advantage does not apply.
78. See Lametti, supra note 40, at 213 ("The resource pooling that is possible using
cloud technology means lower overall costs (through lowered costs for the provider, who
then offers services at lower costs to users) . . . ."). Alternatively, if the provider has already
opted to offer services at zero price, the savings might be passed along in other ways, in-
cluding displaying fewer advertisements to users (thereby lowering users' attention costs
incurred in using the service) or a less-intrusive data-usage policy.
79. See Mowbray, supra note 55, at 2 ("Cloud computing is part of a general architec-
tural trend in the computer industry, moving from users doing computing on their own
hardware using copies of software that they own, to users doing computing on other peo-
ples' machines somewhere in the cloud, using software that they rent.").
80. See supra Part II.C.1 & 3.
81. In the civil context, see, for example, In re iPhone Application Litigation, 844 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1057-59 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the type of end-user device is rele-
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right infringement, to antitrust, and myriad more. Before these is-
sues can be properly adjudicated, however, courts must address the
two fundamental threshold procedural questions addressed by this
Article: jurisdiction and choice of law.
Though the ramifications of procedural decision making in these
areas will indeed be far reaching within the context of the cloud, it is
also critical to recognize their importance for future developments.
Just as the law of the Internet can provide a guidepost for analyzing
legal issues related to cloud computing, so too will cloud-computing
decisions provide the bedrock upon which the law for yet-to-be-
developed technologies will be built.84 The significance of the deci-
sions being made now and in the near future cannot be overstated.
III. PERSONALJURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAw: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Both jurisdiction and choice of law enjoy rich historical back-
grounds. Principles of constitutional federalism have allowed states to
construct varied approaches to these issues that span wide and diverse
vant to the level of protection afforded to data stored in the cloud), and Rene v. G.F Fish-
ers, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1096 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (determining that unopened emails
are subject to the protections of the Stored Communications Act). In the criminal con-
text, see In re United States'Application for a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Electronic Devices
from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1144-45 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (denying applica-
tion for search warrant based on its "boundless" scope due to the interconnectedness of
digital devices), and In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 845-46 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (denying requests for disclosure of location data
for cell phones on Fourth Amendment grounds).
82. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139-40 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that storing copyrighted television programs on proprietary servers and
delivering them via a closed-circuit network to consumers constituted copyright infringe-
ment).
83. The FTC recently announced-though it ultimately abandoned-an investigation
into possible anticompetitive behavior by Google, Inc. Steve Lohr, F. T.C. Said to Prepare for
Lawsuit vs. Google, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, at BI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/technology/ftc-staff-prepares-antitrust-case-against-
google-over-search.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The gravamen of the investigation was
Google's possible manipulation of results delivered by its dominant search engine so as to
favor internal cloud-based software services like Google Maps, to the detriment of compet-
ing services like MapQuest. Id.
84. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Princi-
ples to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2219 (2009)
("Courts often address new technologies by analogizing to older technologies, in the same
way novel legal theories generally find their proper footing by analogy to precedent.")
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continua. 5  Accordingly, while there are certain prevailing theories
that have risen to prominence and gained solid footing in the law-
especially in choice-of-law jurisprudence-examining the various phi-
losophies underlying these critical threshold issues is essential to pro-
vide context for our proposed solutions to the cloud-computing co-
nundrums. The Parts below review the maturation of personal-
jurisdiction and choice-of-law theories throughout the years, with a
particular focus on the advents of, and legal adaptations to, new tech-
nologies.
A. PersonalJurisdiction: Gatekeeper of Civil Litigation
Personal jurisdiction is, put simply, "[a] court's power to bring a
person into its adjudicative process.",6  "Personal jurisdiction asks a
simple question. It asks whether a particular court may enter judg-
ment against a particular defendant in a particular case."87 Unlike
choice of law-which is open-ended in the sense that each party may
argue for application of a different set of laws and the court may apply
still a third set of laws not advanced by either party-personal jurisdic-
tion is a binary battle. That is to say that it is either existent or not;"
there is no possible "third outcome" that a court might reach. Per-
sonal jurisdiction is also unique from choice of law in that it is one-
sided, that is, there is no such thing as a court lacking personal juris-
diction over a plaintiff."9
85. See Charles W. Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal jurisdiction Doctrine: A
Case Study on the Effect of a "Generally" Too Broad, but "Specifically" Too Narrow Approach to Min-
imum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 137-38 (2005) (personal jurisdiction); Genevieve G.
York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1793, 1796 (2009) (choice of law). But see Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982) ("The restriction on state sovereign power ...
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the
Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction require-
ment and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns."). Many states,
however, provide for personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the fullest extent allowable
within the contours of constitutional due process. In this instance, courts sometimes "pass
over" the state-law analysis and "collapse it into[] the due process inquiry." Diamond Crys-
tal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1258 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2010).
86. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).
87. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 979 (2009).
88. See Rhodes, supra note 85, at 136-37.
89. Cf Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction
and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REv. 479, 508-09 (1987) ("[M]odern courts con-
tinue to perceive personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between state power and the de-
fendant, with the plaintiffs interest being largely irrelevant.").
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The following Subparts trace the history of personal jurisdic-
tion-fromn its roots in the English common law,9' to the landmark
Supreme Court case International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 up through
the close of the Pre-Network Era.93 We break at the advent of the In-
ternet because although each of these aforementioned periods is dis-
tinct from the period before or after it, they all share the common
theme that personal jurisdiction is based on some notion of physicali-
ty.Y In other words, the defendant-either in personam or, in the case
of a business, by way of a distributed product in commerce-had to be
physically present in some sense in the jurisdiction where the lawsuit
was initiated for jurisdiction to be proper. As we discuss later, howev-
er, the advent of the Internet changed this longstanding notion, and
personaljurisdiction Internet cases thus cannot-or at least in our
view, should not-be grouped with these previous cases reflecting
comparatively small adjustments of the technological rudder.
1. The Old Guard: Physical Presence and the Transient Rule
The notion of personal jurisdiction over a party dates back to fif-
teenth century England. As early as 1482, the idea that the judgment
of a court that lacked jurisdiction over a defendant was void had al-
ready gained a foothold,99 and the principle became firmly cemented
into the English common law by Lord Coke more than a century lat-
er." At that time, though, jurisdiction was based primarily on a de-
fendant's consent to a court's ability to adjudicate a particular dis-
90. Like others before us who have opined on personal jurisdiction, we "recognize the
merit of critics of legal scholarship who decry the recitation of cases that make up the his-
tory of a doctrine." John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in PersonalJurisdiction, 68 IowA L.
REV. 1015, 1019 n.21 (1983) (citing Lawrence R. Velvel, Suggested Improvements in Legal Ed-
ucation, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 194, 201 (1978) (noting the "often boring descriptions of the
relevant cases")). Nevertheless, we find it useful to provide a brief summary of the im-
portant decisions in this area of the law, especially given the vast departure from tradition-
al brick-and-mortar, single-location entities that cloud-computing service providers repre-
sent.
91. See infra Part III.A.1.
92. See infra Part III.A.2.
93. See infra Part III.A.3.
94. See Perdue, supra note 89, at 509 (noting the long held presumption "that the
proper scope of personal jurisdiction is closely tied to geographic boundaries").
95. Bowser v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482).
96. Case of the Marshalsea, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (KB.) 1039.
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pute, as opposed to a court's power over a party." Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, this submissiveness gradually morphed into courts obtaining
defendants' consent by inducement or force," and around the turn of
the nineteenth century, English courts' determinations of jurisdiction
appeared to be based more on judicial authority than on a party's
voluntary submission.99
Naturally, these concepts migrated from England and became
incorporated into early American common law, and several cases
from the first half of the nineteenth century reflected the principle of
coram non judice-"before a person, not a judge."Oo It was not until
1878, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff'o1 es-
tablished the rule that service in the forum state was both necessary
and sufficient for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction. In Pennoy-
er, an Oregon court determined that the defendant, who was neither
a resident of Oregon nor physically present in Oregon, had been con-
structively served by a newspaper publication in Oregon. 0 2 The Su-
preme Court disagreed. In finding the service to be inadequate, the
Supreme Court announced what has become known as the "transient
rule" of personal jurisdiction: "To give Uudicial] proceedings any va-
lidity ... [a defendant] must be brought within [a state's] jurisdiction
by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.",1o3
Immediately after Pennoyer, it appeared that physical presence
was both necessary and sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court
97. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956) ("Early judicial procedure depended
upon voluntary subjection of both parties to the court's judgment.").
98. Id.
99. See id. at 298 (discussing the English cases Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep.
1021 (K.B.) 1030, 1 COWP. 161, 1076-77 and Buchanan v. Rucker, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep.
546 (KB.) 547).
100. See, e.g., Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 350 (1850); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts &
Serg. 447, 448 (Pa. 1844) ("Jurisdiction of the person or property of an alien is founded
on its presence or situs within the territory. Without this presence or situs, an exercise of
jurisdiction is an act of usurpation."); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273, 275 (1835); Dunn v.
Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N.Y. Ch. 1834); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (C.C.
Mass. 1828); Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 45 (Conn. 1814) ("Where there is a want of
jurisdiction over the person . . . it is the same as though there was no court. It is coram non
judice.").
101. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
102. Id. at 719-20.
103. Id. at 733. Pennoyer is also significant in that the Supreme Court announced that
personal jurisdiction is based on an individual's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Right. Id.
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over a particular defendant. The "sufficient" prong of that phrase
holds true today and was affirmed by the Supreme Court more than a
century after Pennoyer in Burnham v. Superior Court.o' By contrast,
however, the notion of physical presence as a mandatory prerequisite
to jurisdiction slowly eroded in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century (though perhaps unsurprisingly). 0 s For example,
subsequent to Pennoyer, some states began requiring nonresident cor-
porations to designate in-state agents for service of process,' 6 and
other states allowed substituted service over nonresident motorists
who caused injury in a state but left before personal service could be
effected.' 7 These and other exceptions to the requirement that de-
fendants be actually physically present in a given forum state eventual-
ly swallowed the transient rule, 08 and in 1945 the Supreme Court did
away with Pennoyer altogether.
2. The Giant Footprint of International Shoe
"[T] he unbending territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in
Pennoyed"O" were finally put to rest in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
104. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). In Burnham, the defendant, a resident of New Jersey, was
served process pertaining to his estranged wife's divorce petition while he was in California
on a business trip and visiting his children. Id. at 607-08. In affirming the California
Court of Appeal, the Court stated that 'jurisdiction based on physical presence alone con-
stitutes due process." Id. at 619. See also Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 273 N.W.2d
285, 286 (Wis. 1979) ("Physical presence is the traditional basis of judicial jurisdiction.");
Joel H. Spitz, Comment, The "Transient Rule" of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned Con-
cept That Has Overstayed Its Welcome, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 181, 192 n.83 (1989) (collecting cases
that reaffirm that the "sufficient" prong still holds true).
105. Pennoyer recognized certain exceptions to the rigidity of the physical-presence re-
quirement. See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-35 (divorce actions could be adjudicated in
plaintiff's home state even if defendant could not be served within that state); id. at 735-36
(approving of treating a foreign corporation doing business in a state as having consented
to being sued in the state).
106. E.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1882) (summarizing Michigan law re-
garding service of corporations).
107. E.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164-67 (1916) (summarizing New Jersey
law); see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927) (upholding a Massachusetts
statute that appointed the state registrar as a person upon whom process can be served for
a nonresident motorist).
108. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 97, at 309-12 (stating that the exceptions "have be-
come so significant in number and weight that they have virtually overwhelmed the [Pen-
noyer] rule itself' and noting several exceptions).
109. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990).
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ton."0 Hailed as a "watershed in the law of personal jurisdiction""
and revered as the "prince" that "slew the evil dragon" of Pennoyer,"2
International Shoe set forth a new governing test for defining the outer
bounds of a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction that still serves as
the bedrock of the doctrine today.
International Shoe Co. ("Shoe Co.") was a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri."' Shoe Co.
manufactured shoes in, and distributed shoes from, several states oth-
er than Washington, and did not have any offices or any contracts for
the sale or purchase of merchandise in Washington. 1 4 Shoe Co. did,
however, employ salesmen under the direct supervision and control
of managers in St. Louis and supplied the salesmen with shoe samples
that the salesmen would sometimes exhibit in rented rooms in Wash-
ington."' The salesmen resided in Washington and were compen-
sated based on sales made there."' The salesmen would send shoe
orders back to Shoe Co.'s St. Louis office, where the orders would be
filled and the shoes shipped into Washington from other states."
The issue in International Shoe was whether Shoe Co., based on
the above-mentioned contacts with Washington, was within the scope
of Washington's Unemployment Compensation Act."" If Shoe Co.
was, then it needed to contribute a percentage of its employees' an-
nual wages to Washington's state unemployment compensation fund.
The State of Washington sued Shoe Co. for past contributions and
personally served a Shoe Co. salesman in Washington. Shoe Co. then
appeared specially to contest jurisdiction."'9 After several appeals, the
110. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This is true, however, only as to the "necessary" prong of
physical presence as being both "necessary and sufficient." See supra note 104 and accom-
panying text (discussing Burnham and the significance of physical presence with regard to
jurisdiction).
111. Logan Everett Sawyer III, jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological
Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 59, 59 (2001).
112. Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 257,
258 (1990).
113. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 313.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 313-14.
116. Id. at 313.
117. Id. at 314.
118. Id. at 311.
119. Id. at 312.
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Supreme Court of Washington ruled that Shoe Co. was amenable to
suit in Washington."0
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. In doing so, the Court an-
nounced the standard for personal jurisdiction that has been echoed
often and thunderously over the last six-plus decades"':
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.122
The Court declined, however, to adopt any sort of bright-line test
or standard that was "mechanical or quantitative" like the Pennoyer
test. 1 Instead, the Court determined that whether due process was
satisfied depended "upon the quality and nature of the activity in rela-
tion to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure." 24 This inquiry requires
examining, inter alia, "the extent that a corporation exercises the priv-
ilege of conducting activities within a state" such that "it enjoys the
benefits and protection of the laws of that state."125
It is worth noting that the Court was clear in International Shoe
that the basis of the suit-Shoe Co.'s obligation to contribute to the
state unemployment fund-arose from Shoe Co.'s specific contacts
with the forum state.'26 The Court did not, however, foreclose the no-
tion that jurisdiction can still be proper even when the events giving
rise to a lawsuit are unrelated to a nonresident corporation's contacts
120. See id. at 314 (articulating the Supreme Court of Washington's reasoning "that the
regular and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by appellant's salesman, resulting
in a continuous flow of appellant's product into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing
business in the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts").
121. See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court
Opinions and justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 437 tbl.3 (2010) (listing International Shoe as the
eighteenth most-cited Supreme Court opinion by federal district courts).
122. Int'lShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 319; see supra note 103 and accompanying text (setting forth the transient
rule from Pennoyer).
124. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 320.
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with the forum state. 27 In such a case, jurisdiction is proper because
the defendant corporation is said to be "present" within the forum
state by having "systematic and continuous" contacts. 2 1
3. Stream-of-Commerce and Far-Reaching Effects Theories
The Supreme Court's adoption of the "minimum contacts"
standard in International Shoe was a reaction to the evolving methods
by which business was conducted in the twentieth century. As cross-
country and interstate transportation became more prevalent, firms
were broadening the reach of their services and products to consum-
ers in all corners of the country. 29 And while the standard set forth in
International Shoe certainly applies to individuals, the opinion itself is
plainly geared toward business entities.30
Although International Shoe is a single case, it is undoubtedly an
important one. But, as with many standard-setting cases, the progeny
that followed International Shoe is (at least arguably) just as important
as International Shoe itself-for it is the subsequent cases interpreting a
new standard that often truly define the standard's contours.' A
127. See id. at 318 ("[T] here have been instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.").
128. See id. at 318, 320 (stating that "it may be said that [certain] authorized acts [are]
of such a nature as to justify the fiction" that a corporation has consented to service and
suit "through the acts of its authorized agents" in the forum state).
129. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) ("In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and
the tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an 'inevitable relaxation of the
strict limits on state jurisdiction' over nonresident individuals and corporations." (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black,J., dissenting))).
130. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 ("Since the corporate personality is a fiction,
although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike
an individual its 'presence' without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be mani-
fested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it."
(internal citation omitted)); see also Sawyer, supra note 111, at 59-60 ("International Shoe
resulted directly from the inability of the Pennoyer doctrine to adjust to the twentieth cen-
tury expansion of corporate business.... In short, the standard explanation claims Inter-
national Shoe simply adjusted constitutional doctrine to the practical demands of society.").
131. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941) ("leav[ing] it to future
judicial decisions to determine precisely where the line shall be drawn"); In re Seagate
Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("We leave it to future cases to further
develop the application of this standard."); cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)
("Whatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in
holding without further elaboration that they do not exist here."); Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1971) (establishing a new standard for First Amendment
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comprehensive review of all subsequent cases interpreting and apply-
ing International Shoe could easily consume an entire civil procedure
class. Thus, we have chosen to touch upon only the leading cases to
set the stage for discussing the law of the Internet. 32
We begin with a 1961 case out of the Illinois Supreme Court,
Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.'"3 In Gray, an Illi-
nois resident sued an Ohio company, alleging negligent construction
of a safety valve on a water heater that had exploded and injured him.
The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that it did not con-
duct business in Illinois, had no agent physically present in Illinois,
and sold the valves to another defendant outside Illinois for incorpo-
ration into the water heater.134 The court recognized that "the de-
fendant's only contact with [Illinois was] found in the fact that a
product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated in Pennsylvania, in-
to a hot water heater which in the course of commerce was sold to an
Illinois consumer."'"
Nevertheless, the court found that this contact passed muster
under International Shoe. The court determined that "it is not unrea-
sonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in [a]
product, to say that the use of such products in the ordinary course of
commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify a requirement
that [a company] defend here." 6 This holding was based on "the in-
creasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing inter-
dependence of business enterprises."' 7 The Gray court's reasoning
has become known as the "stream-of-commerce theory" in personal
jurisdiction.'
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to accept
Gray's stream-of-commerce theory for personal jurisdiction. In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'" the Court rejected the notion that
libel actions while "leaving the delineation of the reach of [certain] term[s] to future cas-
es").
132. See infra Part IV.A.
133. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
134. Id. at 762.
135. Id. at 764.
136. Id. at 766.
137. Id.
138. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIn-
tyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202, 207-08 (2011).
139. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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a company having no other contacts with the forum state could be
subject to jurisdiction there merely because a consumer transported
its product to a state other than the state where the product was pur-
chased. 4 0  The Court noted the limits on the stream-of-commerce
theory, stating that "'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause," '4 and asserting that acceptance of the stream-of-commerce
theory in its purest form would have the effect of "appoint[ing] the
chattel [as an] agent for service of process."4
Later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,'43 the Court
unanimously declined to find personal jurisdiction over a Japanese
firm that manufactured tire valves and sold them to a Taiwanese cor-
poration, which subsequently incorporated the valves into motorcycle
tires sold in California. 4 4 The Asahi Court held that "a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant pur-
posefully directed toward the forum State," and that "[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." 1
As we wrap up this Subpart, there is one other case-Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz' 4 ---that warrants individual attention and that serves
as a jumping-off point for our discussion of Internet personal jurisdic-
tion. Burger King is of particular importance because it is a contract
case and, as detailed above, the legal structure of the cloud is based
primarily on a contract theory."'4  Additionally, Burger King deals with
intellectual property (albeit in a roundabout way), a common source
of litigation in the cloud. 4" Burger King involved a lawsuit by the
Burger King Corporation against two of its fast-food restaurant fran-
140. Id. at 299.
141. Id. at 295.
142. Id. at 296.
143. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
144. Id. at 116.
145. Id. at 112. Two very recent Supreme Court cases provide additional support for
the idea that the stream-of-commerce theory is, at least with regard to foreign defendants,
surviving only on life support. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846, 2854-57 (2011); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790-91
(2011). For a more detailed discussion of Goodyear and McIntyre, see Peterson, supra note
138, at 211-18 (Goodyear) and 218-35 (McIntyre).
146. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
147. See supra Part II.C.2.
148. See, e.g., supra note 82.
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chisees for breach of a franchise agreement and trademark infringe-
ment.'49 Burger King sued in Florida, where its headquarters were lo-
cated and where the agreement was primarily negotiated, though the
franchisees and individual restaurant at issue were located in Michi-
gan.' The Supreme Court, in reversing the Eleventh Circuit,'"' de-
termined that jurisdiction was proper over the defendants even
though they had no physical presence in Florida.' The Court relied
on the defendants' many communications sent via mail regarding the
franchisee agreement to establish the requisite minimum contacts
with Florida. 113
In a foreshadowing of future communications technology and
the litigation that would ensue as a result, Justice Brennan stated in
Burger King
Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a po-
tential defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the
reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable
fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of
business is transacted solely by mail and wire communica-
tions across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical
presence within a State in which business is conducted. So
long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully di-
rected" toward residents of another State, we have consist-
ently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts
can defeat personal jurisdiction there.5 4
4. Summary
What began as a change merely recognized by International Shoe
eventually came to serve as the basis of the holding in Burger King.
The shift from local firms doing business locally, to local firms doing
business nationally, to national firms doing business nationally and
internationally, meant new challenges for courts on issues relating to
personal jurisdiction. Although the current landscape of Internet
and cloud commerce could be phrased roughly as "invisible firms do-
ing business everywhere," the themes echoed in the cases above pro-
149. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 468-69.
150. Id. at 464-67.
151. Id. at 487.
152. Id. at 476 ("Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because
the defendant did not physically enter the forum State.").
153. Id. at 479-82.
154. Id. at 476.
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vide valuable insight into the current state of the law 5 and, crucially
for our discussion below, what its future will be.
B. Choice of Law: Rule Maker of Civil Litigation
Choice of law is the pre-merits question that necessarily follows
that ofjurisdiction. Broadly speaking, before a court reaches the sub-
stantive issues presented by a lawsuit, it must first decide whether it
has the authority to apply any laws to the facts at hand, that is, wheth-
er it has jurisdiction."' If jurisdiction is proper, courts must then de-
termine which law or set of laws it ought to apply-it must make a
"choice of law.""'
The evolution"' of choice of law in the United States has fol-
lowed an uneven path. As an initial note, "choice of law" is a some-
what nebulous term in U.S. jurisprudence and scholarship. Depend-
ing on the speaker, it can encompass concepts as far-ranging as the
recognition and enforcement ofjudgments, the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. laws, and "vertical" conflicts between federal and state laws. As
used herein, however, "choice of law" refers to situations where the
laws of two or more jurisdictions might conceivably govern a set of ac-
tions or events. Put another way, it contemplates "horizontal" con-
flicts between laterally situated laws. It is within this area of focus that
the following Parts briefly retrace the history of U.S. choice-of-law
theory and summarize the primary modes of analysis still in use today.
1. The Traditional Theories: Sovereignty, Comity, and "Vested
Rights"
Choice of law arose as a discrete area of jurisprudence in the
United States following the publication of Justice Story's treatise,
155. See, e.g., Richard Philip Rollo, Note, The Morass of Internet Personal jurisdiction: It Is
Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 678 (1999) ("Many courts hold that the ap-
propriate personal jurisdiction standard based upon Internet contacts is analogous to the
stream of commerce standard in Asahi.").
156. See supra text accompanying note 86.
157. As an initial note, there is a strain of thought in conflicts scholarship-the "local
law" theory-that posits a different structure. Under this view, courts always apply forum
law-even when adjudicating disputes by referring to the content of foreign law-given
that they have no power to do otherwise. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Two "Local Law"
Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822, 824-25 (1950). This theory has become relatively marginal
today. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631,
1634-37 (2005).
158. In this context, even that word is an arguable choice, implying as it does that the
law has, in fact, progressed. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, in 1824. As travel and trade be-
tween the states grew more prevalent, Story recognized that the
common-law rule-English courts had always applied English law-
was fast becoming antiquated. Story proposed two theoretical princi-
ples that greatly influenced subsequent courts and scholars: (1) each
state has "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territo-
ry";'59 and as a result, (2) the court of one sovereign jurisdiction may
apply another sovereign's laws, but it does so only as a matter of comi-
ty, that is, out of a sense of benevolence or neighborliness toward the
foreign sovereign. 6 0 justice Story's tenets, metaphysical as they were,
unsurprisingly proved difficult to implement, for the Commentaries
gave no real instructions on how or when the principles should be
applied. It would be over a century before another scholar attempted
to supply those answers.
In 1934, the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws ("First Restate-
ment") was promulgated, with Professor Joseph Beale as its primary
architect. Underlying the First Restatement was the theory that an
individual's legal cause of action was a legal right, one that inhered-
or "vested"-in that individual at a specific point in time.'6 ' It fol-
lowed, under Beale's logic, that the state within whose sovereign bor-
ders such a right vested should be the state whose substantive law ap-
plies to any ensuing litigation. 6 2 Justice Story's notion of territorial
"sovereignty" as critical to choice-of-law analysis was thus carried for-
ward by Beale. 6 3
Unsurprisingly, given its theoretical underpinnings, the First Re-
statement approach heavily emphasized physical location and territo-
riality. The obvious problem, of course, lies in determining the pre-
cise temporal and spatial point at which rights vested, leading Beale to
enunciate a rigid set of rules that were supposed to do just that.
159. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1883).
160. Id. § 38.
161. SeeJOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8A.8 (1935).
162. Beale's rules were, as David Cavers pointed out, 'jurisdiction-selecting rule[s],"
that is, they required a court to determine which jurisdiction's set of laws applied to a case,
rather than which law should apply. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,
47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933).
163. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as
Conflict ofLaws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 36 & n.133 (2010) ("The first question in any
conflicts case for Beale ... was to determine the jurisdiction of nations ... because Beale
viewed law as fundamentally territorial and, thus, no law had effect outside of its own terri-
tory.").
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Broadly speaking, the First Restatement rules specify which aspects of
which events indicate that a cause of action has become a vested right,
pinpointing a moment in time and space where the location of indi-
viduals, property, or events indicate the jurisdiction whose laws ought
to apply. 16
More specifically, the First Restatement sets forth three primary
rules that govern tort, contract, and property law disputes. In tort,
whether a cause of action exists is dependent on lex locus delicti, the
"law of the place of wrong."'65 Additional sections enumerate specific
issues that are so governed. 16 As to contract, the relevant rule de-
pends on whether the dispute at bar involves contract formation or
performance. Issues involving contract formation are governed by
the law of the state where the contract was formed; 6 issues involving
performance are governed by the law of the place of performance.'8
Conflicts involving real property fall under the "situs" rule, that is,
they are governed by the law of the place where the property is situat-
ed. 16 Many, though not all, conflicts involving movable property are
also covered by this rule.7 0
On the whole, Beale's vested-rights theory was designed to pro-
vide a unified framework under which courts could easily and me-
chanically determine which set of laws should apply to disputes with
multijurisdictional elements, thus furthering the formalist school's
cherished goals of uniformity and predictability of outcomes. Indeed,
"it was generally believed that the entire field could be covered by a
relatively small number of simple rules."'7 ' This promise of efficiency
164. See generally William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts,
56 MD. L. REV. 1196 (1997) (analyzing contemporary applications of the First Restate-
ment).
165. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934) (interstate torts).
166. E.g., id. §§ 378 (whether a cognizable injury occurred) and 379 (whether liability is
strict or dependent on negligence or intent).
167. Id. § 332 (validity of contracts).
168. Id. § 358 (duty for performance).
169. Id. §§ 214-54 (law governing "Immovables").
170. Compare, e.g., id. §§ 255-310 (law governing "Movables"), with id. §§ 303 (intestate
succession governed by law of decedent's domicile), 306 (same for testamentary succes-
sion).
171. Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679, 679 (1963).
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and restraint on judicial discretion led to the First Restatement's rap-
id adoption by most states. 7 1
Yet Beale's territorial rules, elegant as they may have been in
theory, utterly failed to produce uniform results in practice. Judges
faced with applying inflexible rules to complex choice-of-law ques-
tions almost immediately began using "escape devices."' 3 Perhaps the
most widely used escape device was "characterization." Though Beale
had implicitly assumed otherwise, determining what sort of issue is at
play in a given choice-of-law case (for example, contract performance
versus formation) is a process that leaves considerable wiggle room
for judges inclined to pursue normative ends. Consider a breach-of-
contract case where the parties dispute whether the obligor's perfor-
mance satisfied an arguably ambiguous contract term. Is the issue
one of contract-making (causing the law of the place of contracting to
apply) due to the contract's inclusion of the ambiguous term, or one
of performance (causing the law of the place of contract performance
to apply)? In such instances, the First Restatement left enough lati-
tude for courts to engage in "characterization" and ultimately choose
the law that appeared to be more equitable, appropriate, or perhaps
easier to apply.' 4 Other such escape devices included renvoi'7 5 and the
public policy exception."7
Clearly, many courts were unwilling to surrender the ability to
choose which law ought to apply in a case, even where their jurisdic-
tion had nominally adopted the supposedly rigid, mechanistic First
Restatement approach. This was not universally true-many judges
172. See PatrickJ. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 357, 357 (1992) ("Until 1963 the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (the
First Restatement) commanded a nearly universal following.").
173. Richman & Riley, supra note 164, at 1199.
174. See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1878) (providing an often-cited ex-
ample of characterization).
175. In the breach-of-contract example used above, renvoi would entail the forum court
choosing not only to apply a foreign jurisdiction's substantive contract law, but also that
jurisdiction's choice-of-law rules (i.e., the forum would "accept the renvot"). In instances
where the foreign jurisdiction's choice-of-law rule would refer the case to yet another ju-
risdiction, choosing to accept the renvoi would obviously affect the outcome-and perhaps
allow a provincially minded forum court to apply its own law even under the guise of obey-
ing Beale's rules. For an example of this in action, see Univ. of Chi. v. Dater, 270 N.W.
175, 176 (Mich. 1936) (applying Illinois law to a Michigan case).
176. Some courts held that, where applying the law of another jurisdiction would con-
flict with a "fundamental" public policy of their own legislature or executive, "sovereignty"
would win out and forum law should apply. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of
Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1997).
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have, over time, striven to apply the First Restatement rules as faithful-
ly as possible. And, particularly in "easy" cases, the First Restatement
does offer a structured analysis that some judges find appealing. Even
today, ten jurisdictions still follow the First Restatement approach for
tort claims, and twelve follow it in contract disputes."' By any meas-
ure, however, it has fallen into steep decline relative to its former
predominance.
2. The Modem Approaches: Governmental Interest Analysis, the
Second Restatement, and "Better Law"
After only a few decades-a period that has been called, only
half-jokingly, the "Reign of Terror""'-the ascendency of the vested-
rights theory began to wane. The next revolution in choice-of-law
analysis was ignited by a series of articles authored by Professor Brain-
erd Currie."'9 According to Currie, the primary problem with Beale's
'jurisdiction-selecting" rules"' was that they failed entirely to take ac-
count of a sovereign's interests. That is, once a court selected the
proper jurisdiction wherein a litigant's right had vested, it was to ap-
ply that jurisdiction's law without any regard to whether the foreign
sovereign actually had any legitimate interest in having its law apply to
the facts at hand.'"' In short, Currie argued that courts ought to con-
sider such interests in making choice-of-law decisions. Applying this
"interest analysis," judges could weed out "false conflicts"-situations
in which only one jurisdiction has any actual interest in seeing its law
applied. Of course, not all conflicts are so easily adjudicated. As to
"real" conflicts, Currie settled on the arguably unprincipled rule that
courts should default to applying the law of the forum. 182
177. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice-of-Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth
Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 309 tbl.1 (2012) (displaying an alphabetical list of
U.S. states and the choice-of-law methodologies followed by each).
178. Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1376.
179. See GaryJ. Simson, Choice-of-Law After the Currie Revolution: What Role for the Needs of
the Interstate and International Systems?, 63 MERCER L. REv. 715, 716 (2012) ("[Currie's] writ-
ings, far more than anyone else's, sparked what many have come to call a 'revolution' in
choice-of-law.").
180. Cavers, supra note 162, at 194.
181. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
182. Currie's default-to-forum rule has been criticized by many; for one notable exam-
ple, see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 8-9
(1963) (arguing that "[n]ormative resolution of real conflicts cases is possible").
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Within scholarly circles, at least, interest analysis (in all its various
iterations") rapidly came to dominate the field of choice of law. To-
day, however, only two jurisdictions still follow in Currie's footsteps,
and those two do so only for tort claims.'8 4 Perhaps because it was
such a radical shift from the First Restatement-and because it
seemed to run directly counter to the goals of uniformity and predict-
ability that had animated the First Restatement's widespread adoption
in the first place-interest analysis in its pure form has failed to gain
widespread acceptance among courts.
In a watered-down form, however, Currie's interest analysis was
incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second
Restatement"). The Second Restatement, promulgated in 1971 and
still in effect today, is a curious melange: it contains Currie's precepts,
nestled within a more open-ended, policy-oriented analytical frame-
work, yet it also sets forth territorial-centric presumptions that bear a
strong resemblance to the rigid rules of the First Restatement. The
overarching rule, regardless of the substantive law, is that the applica-
ble law is that of the state with the "most significant relationship" to
the relevant events and parties. 8 6
The Second Restatement's analytical structure involves three
steps. First, the issue must be categorized as, for example, a "con-
tracts" problem or a "torts" problem.8 7  Second, to help determine
which state has the most significant relationship, the Second Restate-
ment creates a set of presumptions contained in specific sections that
cover various types of tort or contract issues.'88  But because these
183. See, e.g., id. at 18 (explaining the least-impairment method).
184. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 (identifying California and the District of
Columbia as the only jurisdictions following Currie's interest analysis).
185. See Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1383-84 ("The influence [of Currie], however, is
almost solely in the academy; although judges often mention Currie, they rarely follow his
lead.").
186. See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of jurisdictional Rules, 86 TUL. L.
REV. 623, 646 (2012) (noting that most "American courts ... have adopted the most signif-
icant relationship approach" to resolving conflicts of laws and "have abandoned the tradi-
tional vested-rights approach").
187. See Harold P. Southerland, A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, 27 VT. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2002) (describing the framework of the Second Restate-
ment).
188. See id. at 9 (explaining that "[t]he specific rules of the Second Restatement ... are
cast only in the form of presumptions").
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rules are only presumptions,'89 the analysis does not end there. In-
stead, a court must decide which state truly has the most significant
relationship in light of enunciated general choice-of-law principleso
and the lists of relevant contacts for tort'9' or contract'92 issues.
The Second Restatement has been "savaged" by the majority of
legal scholars.'9 Yet courts have eagerly embraced it, likely because its
presumptive rules provide at least the appearance of structure while
its more general factors allow a fair amount of flexibility." Partly as a
result of this judicial popularity, no strong push has been made to-
ward promulgating a Third Restatement. And the many pitfalls that
inhere in any attempt to construct a new, unified choice-of-law theory
have led even some scholars to conclude that we ought to simply
"leave bad enough alone."'. Despite its shortcomings, then, it is per-
haps unsurprising that the Second Restatement remains the most
189. See id. ("[l]t is vital to recognize that in every case the presumption can be rebut-
ted by reference to the general principles sections read in light of the choice-influencing
principles").
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). Section 6 states those
principles as follows:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the
needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the
forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter-
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protec-
tion of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).
191. For tort issues, the " [c]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the principles
of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Id. § 145(2).
192. As to contract issues, absent an ex ante choice made by the parties, "the contacts to
be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to
an issue include: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties." Id. § 188(2).
193. Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1388.
194. See id. at 1389 ("Judges love ... [t]he Second Restatement [because it] permits
them to rely on its eminent authority; yet it is flexible, guides decisions rather than con-
trols them, and permits judges to avoid unjust results.").
195. See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Commentary, Leave Bad Enough Alone, 75 IND. L.J. 649,
651-52 (2000) ("Whatever the shortcomings of the Second Restatement, I am persuaded that
a third is almost certain to be worse.").
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widely adopted choice-of-law methodology in the United States. 196
Notably, however, it is used by only a plurality of jurisdictions, 97 leav-
ing room for still more competing theories to be developed and
adopted.
Professor Robert Leflar, writing in the 1960s, proposed the
"Leflar" or "better law" approach to choice-of-law analysis.'98  Leflar
contended that a set of five "choice-influencing considerations"
should be used to decide among multiple competing laws."9 Includ-
ed in Leflar's considerations were maximizing predictability of results,
maintaining interstate and international order, simplifying the judi-
cial task, advancing the forum jurisdiction's own governmental inter-
ests, and-most famously-applying the "better" rule of law.2 00 The
last consideration contemplates a sort of qualitative, normative in-
quiry that remains unique among choice-of-law rules.20' Within the
United States, five states have adopted the better-law approach for
tort cases; two have done so for contract claims.202
3. Lex Fori: Choosing Not to Decide
A handful of states have at some point formally adopted a form
of the "lex fod'203 approach to choice of law. Under this approach,
courts generally apply what amounts to a presumption in favor of ap-
plying the law of the forum. Thus, for example, the Michigan Su-
preme Court has stated that "[it] will apply Michigan law unless a 'ra-
tional reason' to do so otherwise exists., 204 Michigan's approach has
196. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1 (identifying twenty-eight states that
apply some form of the Second Restatement in determining choice-of-law).
197. See id. (noting that twenty-four states use the Second Restatement methodology for
tort cases and twenty-three for contract cases).
198. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 295-304 (1966).
199. Id. at 282.
200. Id.
201. Cf Carlos M. Vzquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revi-
sionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
1495, 1582-83 (2011) ("[The better-law] test differs from the others in that it openly re-
quires an evaluation of the substance of the contending laws.").
202. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1 (stating that only Arkansas, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Wisconsin employ the better-law approach in
tort cases; and only Minnesota and Wisconsin apply it in contract cases).
203. Meaning, literally, "[t]he law of a forum."
204. Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997).
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been described as a "hybrid lex fon system,,2 05 one that "combines a
presumption in favor of forum law with governmental interest analy-
sis., 206  Kentucky, by way of contrast, once used a strict lex Jon ap-
proach,2 07 but the current state of its law is somewhat less clear-it
now purports to apply lexfoni rules (the "any significant contacts" test)
in tort and the Second Restatement in contract disputes.208 Yet, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky recently applied Second Restatement
principles in a tort action, reasoning that the specific choice-of-law is-
sue at bar was evidentiary in nature and was therefore "neither a tort
nor a contract issue. 200
Finally, Nevada courts at one time applied a version of the lexfoni
approach to conflicts of law in tort cases. As the Nevada Supreme
Court formulated its (now-defunct) rule, "the law of the forum (the
place where the action is brought) governs in a tort case, unless an-
other state has an overwhelming interest."210 Nevada has since, how-
ever, formally adopted the Second Restatement approach.2 " Today,
only Kentucky and Michigan are identified as overtly using lex fo i,
though it appears in various lesser iterations in other jurisdictions.
4. Moving Forward: Defining Normative Goals
Cloud-computing markets are presently among the most dynamic
markets across all industries. The scope and speed of innovation in
the cloud has, thus far, been breathtaking.214 As discussed above, the
205. Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559, 574 (2002).
206. Id.
207. See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) ("When the court has juris-
diction of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law. The
basic law is the law of the forum, which should not be displaced without valid reasons.").
208. Saleba v. Schrand, 300 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Ky. 2009).
209. Id.; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009:
Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM.J. COMP. L. 227, 291 (2010) (discussing Saleba).
210. Motenko v. MGM Distrib., Inc., 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996), overruled by Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 134 P.3d 111 (Nev. 2006).
211. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 P.3d at 116 ("'e take this opportunity to clarify Nevada's
choice-of-law jurisprudence and hold that the Second Restatement's most significant rela-
tionship test governs choice-of-law issues in tort actions . . .
212. See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1.
213. See infra Part V.A.3.
214. See, e.g., Won Kim, Cloud Computing: Today and Tomorrow, 8J. OBJECr TECH. 65, 65-
66 (2009) (discussing the advances in computing and information technologies that allow
the computing field to envision a transition into the cloud computing era).
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transition to cloud computing as the dominant computing para-
digm-while made possible by the buildup of robust Internet archi-
tecture, advances in data-center technology and design, and an array
of other developments-represents an evolution into uncharted terri-
tory. And as such, the cloud also offers a tabula rasa, a clean slate,
upon which jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules might be written so as
to avoid the missteps courts have made when confronted with the rise
of the Internet.
A robust and growing body of economic theory and empirical re-
search demonstrates that the welfare gains from innovation-both in
terms of consumer and total welfare-far outweigh the gains from en-
suring efficient static price competition,1 which had for decades
been the focus of competition enforcement.211 Consequently, institu-
tions in the United States and elsewhere have recognized that protect-
ing innovation ought to be a primary goal of the law in legal fields
218 *219 * 220
such as competition (antitrust), intellectual property, privacy,
telecommunications,22 and diverse other areas.2 2 2 Innovation-derived
215. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.
216. See, e.g.,J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 581, 603 (2009) ("Industry after industry can demonstrate gains from
dynamic (innovation-driven) competition that overshadow the gains when competition is
present but innovation is absent."); see Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Produc-
tivity Growth: A Review of Theory and Evidence 19-20 (OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No.
317, 2002), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.318059.
217. This arguably misguided focus on "allocative" efficiency is generally associated
with the Chicago School of Economics. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?:
Applying the New Antitrust Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 1479, 1480 (1998-1999) ("[T]he model of neoclassical price theory as interpreted by
the so-called Chicago School[] incorporates a static view of competition and an exaggerat-
ed faith in entry and market forces .... ).
218. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 23-24 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf
(devoting an entire subsection to "Innovation and Product Variety").
219. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (2011) (proposing various
reforms to IP laws that would promote innovation).
220. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
221. See Bhagwat, supra note 217, at 1480.
222. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1726, 1779 (2008) ("In addition to supporting voluntary obligations, [con-
tract law] also .. . permit[s] and encourage[s] normative innovation . . . .").
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welfare gains have driven the rapid deployment and adoption of the
cloud to date.
Given that cloud computing represents such an innovative, dy-
namic field, it lies at the core of these policy concerns. And given that
it constitutes a relatively clean slate, it also represents a unique oppor-
tunity to implement rules and methodologies that further these con-
cerns. 2 4 As a baseline, any discussion of what normative goals juris-
diction and choice-of-law jurisprudence should seek to further in the
context of cloud computing must include the promotion and protec-
tion of innovation.
Much like the emergence of the Internet, the rise of cloud com-
puting both informs, and is informed by, the broader trend of global-
ization-political, social, legal, and economic cross-border interaction
and integration-that has emerged as a master narrative in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. By allowing true location
independence,' cloud computing represents (as did the rise of
ubiquitous Internet access) a paradigm shift toward cosmopolitan-
ism."2 And as a purely technical matter, cloud services would func-
tion best in a homogenized, borderless world.' Such a world would
maximize cloud-sourcing efficiencies by allowing seamless workload
migration around the globe.2
Yet, as noted above, the challenge of globalization-in the realm
of cloud computing no less than elsewhere-lies not in ignoring cul-
tural differences, but in simultaneously fostering cross-border interac-
tion and respecting nonlocal structures and traditions. The shift to
the cloud is a shift toward consumption of computing as a service; it is
consequently also a shift toward a contractual paradigm for interac-
tions.2" Hence, the rate of adoption of cloud processes will depend
(at least in part) upon the willingness and ability of parties to con-
223. See supra Part II.C (discussing the relative advantages of cloud computing over tra-
ditional, localized computing).
224. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
225. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59; Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 5 ("Location in-
dependence means, from the customer's perspective, that the services can be accessed
from anywhere with suitable communications links.").
226. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 321-22
(2002).
227. See supra Part II.C.1.
228. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of work-
load migration).
229. See supra Part II.C.2.
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tract. And as contract theorists have recognized, maximizing trust
and mutual respect and minimizing information asymmetries among
parties (and potential parties) increases the number, scope, and effi-
ciency of contract-based interactions."'o
Thus, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules in the cloud
can best serve the aims of fostering cross-border dealings, respecting
unique structures and traditions, and promoting the dissemination of
innovation by seeking to achieve three values. First, personal jurisdic-
tion and choice-of-law approaches should function predictably, that is,
in such a way that parties can ex ante form reasonably educated guess-
es as to what forum is proper for suit and what set of laws will apply to
their interactions and order those interactions accordingly. Second,
and relatedly, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law approaches
should function in an open and transparent manner. And third, per-
sonal jurisdiction and choice-of-law approaches should function ob-
jectively, that is, without unduly favoring either local parties over for-
eign parties, local law over foreign law, or plaintiffs over defendants.
Such features can function to increase the trust and mutual respect
that are essential for coordinated social behavior, while decreasing
inefficient information asymmetries.
Drawing on these normative goals, Parts IV and V below set forth
frameworks for analyzing personal jurisdiction and choice of law in
the cloud. First, these Parts analyze cases and decisions involving In-
ternet disputes and explain why the rules applied-either procedural
or substantive-are not only incongruous for cloud-computing cases,
but also unworkable in practice. These Parts then propose a series of
rules and analytical structures better tailored to resolve these difficult,
yet critically important, threshold questions in cloud-computing dis-
putes.
230. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 762-63 (1992) ("Strategic bargaining under asym-
metric information creates the possibility of contractual inefficiency, . . . the revelation of
information can ... affect efficiency by changing how people bargain.").
231. Cf., e.g., Robert Cooter, Doing What You Say: Contracts and Economic Development, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2008) ("To coordinate their behavior, people must say what they
will do and do what they say. Contractual commitment is the fundamental means for eco-
nomic coordination provided by law. According to the contract principle for coordina-
tion, the law should enable people to commit to doing what they say. When this principle
is implemented, people can trust each other enough to work together. . . ." (citation omit-
ted)).
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IV. PERSONALJURISDICTION IN THE CLOUD
The inherent technological nature of cloud computing beckons
novel issues of personal jurisdiction.2 2 The fact that servers may be
situated remotely in one location, accessed and manipulated from a
second location, and utilized by third-parties in other, sometimes
multiple, locations calls into question where a defendant in a lawsuit
arising from such a transaction will be subject to personal jurisdiction.
Certainly the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in at
least one of these locations, but which one(s)? And if jurisdiction is
proper where the servers are physically located, what additional prob-
lems arise when the servers are mobile, as is the case with the marine-
based server farms described in Google's patent?...
Before resolving these questions through a series of innovative
proposals, we first pick up where we left off at the end of Part III.A
with the evolution of modern commerce via mass-communication
means. Part IV.A first examines personal-jurisdiction cases involving
Internet transactions. Although likening the Internet to the cloud is
not a strict apples-to-apples comparison,3 the Internet was both a
precursor to the cloud and, arguably more importantly, makes large-
scale cloud computing possible. Thus, courts' approaches to jurisdic-
tion in Internet cases provide a useful foundation for assessing similar
issues that deal with cloud computing. Part IV.B then explains why-
despite the Internet's close relationship with cloud computing-the
Internet model is not a square-peg-square-hole fit for the cloud and
why applying Internet personal-jurisdiction doctrines to cloud-
computing disputes could lead to undesired consequences. Finally,
Part IV.C sets forth a set of novel proposals for personal jurisdiction in
the cloud and offers predictable and comprehensive solutions for
courts and litigants to use in navigating these skies.
232. See, e.g., Dykstra & Riehl, supra note 17, at 32 ("Determining jurisdiction in cloud-
computing environments is unlike any prior jurisdiction analysis. Even more than web-
sites, cloud computing is neither jurisdictional nor multi-jurisdictional. It is non-
jurisdictional in that physical geography frequently does not matter.").
233. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 713-14.
234. See supra Parts II.B and C.
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A. Lessons from Internet Personal-Jurisdiction junsprudence
Prior to the dot-com boom of the 1990s, personal jurisdiction was
tied almost exclusively to companies' physical locations.3 But the ad-
vent of the Internet transformed the conventional notion that busi-
nesses necessarily operate out of brick-and-mortar facilities.2 16  As
globalization and the Internet modernized commercial life, commu-
nication and transaction methods evolved as well-what we now refer
to as "snail mail" yielded to email, and shopping (both for commodi-
ties and specialty items alike) in conventional four-wall stores gave way
to online purchasing and auction websites such as eBay and Amazon.
Recall Justice Brennan's portending statement from Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz that "it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life
that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and
wire communications across state lines." 2 " This doctrinal shift thrust
courts into a modern-day "Wild West" for addressing questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction. "
Fortunately, some early judicial decisions laid the groundwork
for later courts charged with assessing whether personal jurisdiction
was proper over an online-only defendant. While the case law on this
issue is already robust, we need only examine the primary approaches
that gained traction and were broadly adopted before turning our at-
tention to the applicability of these approaches in the cloud.
1. The Zippo Website Continuum
The most prominent test for assessing personal jurisdiction over
online-only defendants that emerged from early cases was the passive-
versus-active website test, haling from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo
235. Am. Bar Ass'n, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global
jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 Bus. LAWYER 1801, 1922 (2000) ("[W]hen ques-
tions of jurisdiction arose in the pre-Internet world, a court could look to the location of
the seller and the location of the buyer to determine if the court had, for personal jurisdic-
tion,... a nexus with the physical location of either the buyer or the seller.").
236. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The Inter-
net represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of... historical, globe-
shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right equipment and knowledge ... to oper-
ate an international business cheaply, and from a desktop.").
237. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
238. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass.
1997) (noting how the parties "attempted to tame the 'Wild West' of the Internet"); Ann
Davis, Tangled Web: How the Net Became Land of Opportunity for Legal Profession, WALL ST. J.
EUROPE, Oct. 14, 1997, at Al (noting the Internet's "freewheeling, new-frontier style").
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Dot Com, Inc.2 39 In Zippo, the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation that
produced the well-known "Zippo" brand of lighters, sued the defend-
240
ant, a California corporation, alleging cyber-squatting on the do-
main names zippo.com, zippo.net, and zipponews.com. 24 The de-
fendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania. The court found that the defendant did not have any
offices, employees, or computer servers in Pennsylvania and that its
contacts with Pennsylvania "occurred almost exclusively over the In-
ternet."2" Those Internet contacts in Pennsylvania included the de-
fendant's website, which offered a news service to end users who sub-
scribed and paid with a credit card for membership; contracts with
seven Internet-access providers in Pennsylvania to permit subscribers
to access the defendant's news service; and approximately three thou-
244
sand Pennsylvania residents who subscribed to the news service.
The Zippo court, in analyzing whether the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant was proper, recognized that "the devel-
opment of the law concerning the permissible scope of personal ju-
risdiction based on Internet use [was] in its infant stages,"24 ' and that
the case law was "scant."246 As a starting point, then, the court relied
on traditional notions of personal jurisdiction from International Shoe
and its progeny.24 ' The court proceeded to distinguish the facts be-
fore it from cases involving what it called merely "passive" websites,
i.e., websites that simply post information without allowing for user
239. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). For a sense of just how novel the Internet was
to courts at this time, consider that the Zippo court went out of its way to explain the mean-
ing of domain names, websites, and the World Wide Web. Id. at 1121 n.1 & 2.
240. For an explanation of cyber-squatting, see Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Cybersquatting:
Identity Theft in Disguise, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 277, 289-90 (2001) ("Cybersquatting occurs
when an individual registers a domain name that is an existing trademark, famous mark,
or individual's name.").
241. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1123.
246. Id. at 1123-24.
247. See id. at 1124 ("Traditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its
boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction
is proper. Different results should not be reached simply because business is conducted
over the Internet." (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))).
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interaction,24 as well as "interactive" websites, i.e., websites that allow
for user interaction but without conducting any commerce. 49 In do-
ing so, the court developed a continuum of what Internet activity on a
website is sufficient to rise to the level of "minimum contacts" with the
forum state such that jurisdiction is proper.
The Zippo sliding scale is as follows: "At one end of the spectrum
are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Inter-
net," that is, "enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdic-
tion that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet.",,o In situations like these, personal jurisdic-
tion is proper because the defendant purposely avails itself of doing
business in a given foreign jurisdiction."' "At the opposite end are
situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an In-
ternet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A
passive Web site that does little more than make information availa-
ble . . . is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction." 2 Fi-
nally, "[t]he middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where
a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the lev-
el of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of infor-
mation that occurs on the Web site."5
Ultimately, the Zippo court determined that personal jurisdiction
was proper over the California defendant.2" The decision is an im-
portant one not for its result, however, but rather for its process. In-
deed, numerous circuit courts subsequently adopted Zippo's passive-
to-active website continuum for assessing personal jurisdiction.255 Yet
Zippo also had its critics, as some courts criticized its sliding scale for
248. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125 (discussing and distinguishing Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), and Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
249. Id. at 1124-25 (discussing and distinguishing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
250. Id. at 1124.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1128.
255. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The
opinion in Zippo. . . has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based
upon the operation of an Internet web site."); see also Michael A. Geist, Toward Greater Cer-
tainty for InternetJurisdiction, 16 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1345, 1367-71 & n.114 (2001) (collect-
ing and discussing cases adopting Zippo).
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being too narrow and inapposite to cases of general jurisdiction, 2
and other courts viewed any specialized test for cases involving the In-
ternet as being entirely unnecessary for engaging in a jurisdictional
analysis."5 Consequently, Zippo fell short of dominating the field of
Internet personal jurisdiction, and competing alternatives quickly
arose in its wake.
2. The Calder "Effects" Test
A second test employed in personal-jurisdiction cases involving
the Internet is the so-called "effects" test. Unlike the Zippo continu-
um, however-which was created as a direct response to the advent of
the Internet-the effects test was fashioned prior to Internet litigation
and was merely adapted to suit the technology of the times. The ef-
fects test is rooted in the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision Calder v.
Jones."' In Calder, a California woman sued a Florida-based publica-
tion and a Florida reporter and Florida editor, in their individual ca-
pacities, alleging libel in a published article. 1'9  The individual de-
fendants argued that jurisdiction was not proper in California because
to find otherwise would "in effect appoint the [article as their] agent
for service of process.",2o Despite gravitating toward a similar argu-
ment in Volkswagen,"6 the Court rejected this notion in Calder. The
Court distinguished Volkswagen by noting that in Calder, the defend-
ants "expressly aimed" their actions at California by "edit[ing] an arti-
cle that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact" on a
California resident.262 The Court noted that although the journalists
256. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the sliding
scale "is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated con-
tacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substan-
tial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general personal jurisdic-
tion").
257. See Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("'Cyberspace ... is not some mystical incantation capable of warding off the jurisdiction
of courts built from bricks and mortar. Just as our traditional notions of personal jurisdic-
tion have proven adaptable to other changes in the national economy, so too are they
adaptable to the transformations wrought by the Internet."); see also TiTi Nguyen, A Survey
of Personal jurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
519, 539-42 (2004) (arguing that the Internet does not require any tailored test for as-
sessing personal jurisdiction).
258. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
259. Id. at 784-86.
260. Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
261. See supra text accompanying note 142.
262. Calder. 465 U.S. at 789-90.
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did not have any relevant physical contacts with the forum, "California
[was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered," and
jurisdiction was thus proper "based on the 'effects' of their Florida
conduct in California." 263
The Calder effects test was subsequently incorporated into juris-
prudence dealing with online disputes. In Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan
Computer Corp., for example, a California court exercised jurisdiction
over a North Carolina defendant under the effects theory for register-
ing and operating websites with confusingly similar domain names
and allegedly infringing the plaintiffs trademarks.64 The court de-
termined that jurisdiction was proper, finding that " [t] he brunt of the
harm was suffered in [California]" because the plaintiff was "based"
there.6  Similarly, in Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff
sued in New Jersey state court for defamation based on comments
posted to an online discussion forum by defendants, who were non-
residents of New Jersey.26" The court in Blakey found that jurisdiction
was proper, reasoning that "[b]ecause defamation was alleged to be
part of the harassing conduct that took place on the [online forum],
it would be fair to posit jurisdiction where the effects of the harassment
were expected or intended to be felt."26 1
Despite the effects test being technology-neutral on its face,
some courts have viewed it in its purest form as being too plaintiff-
friendly when applied to disputes involving Internet activity. The
Fourth Circuit has twice hinted at this conclusion, ' reasoning that
the Internet is available in essentially all jurisdictions and thus a de-
263. Id. at 788-89.
264. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154,1156-57 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
265. Id. at 1159-60.
266. 751 A.2d 538, 555-56 (N.J. 2000).
267. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
268. Compare Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (print magazine), with Nissan, 89 F. Supp. 2d at
1156-57 (Internet website), with Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd.,
34 F.3d 410, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Calder and holding that a defendant "en-
tered" the forum via television broadcast).
269. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that
"Calder does not sweep that broadly"); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293
F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) ("This standard for reconciling contacts through electronic
media with standard due process principles is not dissimilar to that applied by the Su-
preme Court in Calder.... Analogously, under the standard we adopt and apply today,
specific jurisdiction in the Internet context may be based only on an out-of-state person's
Internet activity directed at Maryland and causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim
cognizable in Maryland.").
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fendant's posting of information on a website-such as an allegedly
defamatory article as in Calder-could have "effects" on potential
plaintiffs everywhere.2 0 The effects test thus misses the mark in In-
ternet disputes in that it fails to consider whether a defendant pur-
posefully availed herself to a particular forum. 71 Courts adopting the
Calder approach for the Internet, then-rather than emphasizing the
effects of a defendant's actions-instead relied on the "expressly
aimed" language in Calder and inquired as to the defendant's intent
to cause harm in the forum state.7 Or stated otherwise, and to bor-
row a phrase from the Supreme Court, courts asked whether the de-
fendant "purposely avails" himself of the benefits of interacting with
the forum state.
B. The Internet's Incongruence to the Cloud
The Zippo and Calder tests emerged as the two primary methods
for analyzing personal jurisdiction over Internet activities.7 And be-
270. See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712-13 ("[T]he Internet is omnipresent-when a person
places information on the Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every
jurisdiction .. . . [I] t would be difficult to accept a structural arrangement in which each
State has unlimited judicial power over every citizen in each other State who uses the In-
ternet.").
271. See Young, 315 F.3d at 263 ("Something more than posting and accessibility is
needed to indicate that the [newspapers] purposefully (albeit electronically) directed
[their] activity in a substantial way to the forum state. ... The newspapers must, through
the Internet postings, manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers." (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted)); ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 ("If we were to con-
clude as a general principle that a person's act of placing information on the Internet sub-
jects that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in which the information is ac-
cessed, then the defense of personal jurisdiction, in the sense that a State has
geographically limited judicial power, would no longer exist.").
272. See e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998)
("[Toeppen's] conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring Panavision in
California where Panavision has its principal place of business and where the movie and
television industry is centered. Under the 'effects test,' the purposeful availment require-
ment necessary for specific, personal jurisdiction is satisfied." (emphasis added)).
273. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.").
274. See A. Benjamin Spencer, jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Princi-
ples to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 72 ("In th[e] [Internet]
world, new considerations such as a Web site's 'interactivity' [referring to Zippo] and 'tar-
get audience' [referring to adaptations to Calder] are the essential concepts courts use to
determine whether to treat virtual contacts as minimum contacts.").
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cause the Internet is an important (and debatably the principal 7 )
cog driving the cloud-computing engine, it might seem at first glance
to logically follow that these tests are transferrable to resolve similar
personal-jurisdiction issues that arise in cloud-computing cases. The
nature of the cloud, however, poses barriers to such borrowing by
courts.
Unlike the Internet-which is arguably a software phenomenon
(notwithstanding its infrastructure considerations)-the holistic con-
cept of cloud computing is based on storing data, which inherently re-
lies on hardware. 76 Thus, while the Internet allows for interactivity
over an essentially location-less medium, cloud computing is neces-
sarily (and perhaps counterintuitively) "grounded" by aggregated
servers on land or in water (as in the case of Google's patent) .2 Ad-
ditionally, the Internet has a "face," so to speak. That is, most lawsuits
involving information on the Internet concern users' visual interac-
tion with, and response to, web content.27" By contrast, cloud-
computing disputes often involve the "faceless" access to, and manip-
ulation of, information by parties.
To understand these critical distinctions, consider the following
hypothetical scenario. A data thief in Illinois hacks into a remote,
marine-based server located in the Caribbean Sea. The server stores
credit-card information for numerous credit-lending companies. The
thief steals the credit-card information of X, a resident of New York.
(We say "X," as opposed to "victim" or "plaintiff," to emphasize the
idea that the data thief is unaware of the identity of this person-to
the thief, X could be anyone, located anywhere, and exists merely as
an alphanumeric string of characters in a database file.) X's credit
card draws on funds from a checking account with Bank of America,
which is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
North Carolina. The thief then uses that credit card information to
make purchases from an online vendor in Europe. Mapping how the
275. See Erica Naone, Computer in the Cloud: Online Desktop Systems Could Bridge the Digital
Divide, MIT TECH. REV., Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/408689/
computer-in-the-cloud/ (describing cloud computing as "relying" on the Internet).
276. See supra Part II.C..
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (trademark claim based on defendant's website that "displayed a 'Nissan
Computer' logo that [was] allegedly confusingly similar to the plaintiffs' 'Nissan' logo");
Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 544 (N.J. 2000) (defendants "publish[ing] a
series of what plaintiff view[ed] as harassing gender-based messages, some of which [plain-
tiff] alleges are false and defamatory").
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two prominent Internet jurisdiction tests would apply to the circum-
stances set forth here demonstrates their unworkability in the cloud
context.
First, Zippo provides us with minimal, if any, guidance. As we
mentioned previously, the Zippo framework is tailored specifically to
websites.'" Thus, while it provides a useful tool when evaluating a de-
fendant's outward-facing activity online, it does very little when as-
sessing jurisdiction over a defendant (such as the data thief described
above) whose presence was neither seen nor known by the plaintiff
(X) until the harm was already inflicted. In other words, in Zippo it-
self, and in all subsequent cases that adopted its framework and found
personal jurisdiction to be proper, there was an online interaction be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant that varied in some degree of
commerciality.280 The crux of Zippo was simply a matter of the extent
to which that interaction was commercial or the defendant targeted
end users in the forum state.
In the cloud, however, torts do not have to occur through any
sort of website-host-consumer interaction. Oftentimes, as with our
scenario above, the torts that give rise to a cause of action for the data
owner are acts on the data or server itself. Further, the data's owner is
not necessarily aware of the tortious act until, for example, she checks
her credit-card statement. In this way, cloud torts can be catego-
279. See supra Part IV.A.1.
280. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo dot com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant "contracted
with approximately 3,000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in [the forum
state]"); see also, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1074, 1080 (9th
Cir. 2003) (finding that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant "sold
millions of dollars worth of products in California (about six percent of its total sales)
through its catalog, its toll-free telephone number, and its Internet website" and "main-
tained substantial numbers of 'on-line' accounts for California consumers" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890-91
(6th Cir. 2002) (finding personal jurisdiction because "[t]he granting of passwords to
Michigan residents as part of a contract for [defendant's] services is an interactive usage
showing that [defendant] has intentionally reached out to Michigan customers"); see also
e.g., Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 Fed. Appx. 675, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to
find jurisdiction because plaintiff "ha[d] not alleged that any interaction or exchange of
information occurred between [defendant] and Ohio residents via the website"); Broad-
Voice, Inc. v. TP Innovations, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225 (D. Mass. 2010) (declining to
find jurisdiction because defendant's "website was neither of a commercial nature nor di-
rected specifically to a Massachusetts audience").
281. See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
282. See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal.
2012) ("Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their privacy rights by unlawfully allowing
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rized as unilateral, that is, they require no affirmative act by the plain-
tiff and can be carried out unknowingly. The very nature of the Zippo
test, however, requires the plaintiff to commit some affirmative act
(for example, registering to receive a newsletter) for there to bejuris-
diction-defendant-operators of strictly passive websites do not satisfy
the minimum criteria for a finding of personal jurisdiction.' Accord-
ingly, the Zippo continuum is nontransferable to the cloud due to its
technological narrowness, as well as because of the apples-to-oranges
contrast of website torts versus cloud torts.
Perhaps, then, the Calder effects test-which is broader than the
Zippo test in that it is not technology-limited 284-provides a solution.
285Recall the contacts that we set forth above. Under Calder and
courts' modification of Calder for Internet cases, we must look to ei-
ther the place where the effects of the tort are felt, or alternatively,
where the defendant (the data thief) "expressly aimed" his actions.
For jurisdictional purposes, we can immediately eliminate Europe be-
cause that location is merely fortuitous in that the thief could have
made a purchase anywhere once the information was stolen. Dela-
ware and North Carolina can also be eliminated-were X bringing an
action for recovery of lost funds (which she could also do, but is not
in this scenario), there might be an argument that because the bank
is said to "hold" Xs funds, the monies could be said to have been "lo-
cated" in either Delaware or North Carolina at the time that the theft
occurred, and thus the tort occurred in one of those two locations.
The bank, however, is not responsible for guarding Xs credit-card in-
formation, which is contracted through a third party (for example,
Visa or American Express).
We are left, then, with New York, the Caribbean Sea, and Illinois.
Under the traditional Calder test, personal jurisdiction would arguably
be proper in New York, as that is the state where X likely discovered
that her credit card had been used without authorization and the "ef-
third party applications ('apps') that run on the iDevices to collect and make use of, for
commercial purposes, personal information without user consent or knowledge." (emphasis
added)).
283. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLP, 190 F.3d 333, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying
Zippo and noting that because customers could not take orders through defendant's web-
site, the website did "not classify ... as anything more than [a] passive advertisement
which is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction").
284. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part IV.A.2.
286. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
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fects" of the tort were felt. But, query whether jurisdiction in New
York would comport with International Shoe's mandate of "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice"?2 8 7  Our data thief did
nothing to reach out to New York, did not know X was a citizen of
New York, and did not intend to harm X (at least individually, i.e.,
personally, as compared to other "faceless" victims). For all we know,
our data thief relied on a complex computer algorithm or random-
number generator to pull X's credit-card information from among
millions of others' information in a database. It is safe to say, then,
that our hacker could not reasonably foresee being haled into court
in New York based on actions performed from his computer in Illi-
*288no is.28
Surely, then, jurisdiction is proper in Illinois. To be sure, that is
where our data thief is located and where he committed affirmative
acts to further the tortious conduct. But until now, we have assumed
some importance to our data thief residing in Illinois. In reality,
though, Illinois is no more significant, and no less fortuitous, than
Europe-the location where the credit-card information was subse-
quently used to make purchases. To find jurisdiction proper in Illi-
nois only, then, would seemingly permit wrongdoers to engage in a sort
of quasi forum shopping by running their illicit activities from within
jurisdictions that are defendant-friendly. This result certainly was not
intended.
We are left with the international waters of the Caribbean Sea-
the location of the credit-card company's servers. Arguably, this is
where the final act of the tort (the hacking of the server) was commit-
ted. It might also be true that several jurisdictions could claim to
have an interest in adjudicating the lawsuit (including Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands, which of course have their own U.S. district
courts, but also other countries). But X would be disadvantaged by
being forced to bring suit in any of these jurisdictions. And for the
287. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
288. That is, that X is a resident of New York provides our data thief with a mere "ran-
dom" and "fortuitous" contact to that State, but perhaps not a sufficient contact that gives
rise to jurisdiction there. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)
("Th[e] 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled
into ajurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts . . .
(citation omitted)).
289. Cf supra Part III.B.1 and notes 161-164 and accompanying text (discussing the
"vested rights" approach and the idea of a final act that gives rise to a cause of action for a
tort).
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same reasons that a data thief could not reasonably foresee being
haled into court in New York, X would also likely have trouble over-
coming the jurisdictional threshold to adjudicate the lawsuit in a for-
eign country.
Discussing one by one the locations with some nexus to our fac-
tual scenario above reveals that personal jurisdiction in cloud-
computing disputes presents complex issues. Perhaps X would be
able to defeat a motion to dismiss in any of these jurisdictions and,
ideally, maintain suit in New York. In fact, it is likely that jurisdiction
is proper in more than one of the U.S. terra firma jurisdictions, i.e.,
not in the Caribbean. But the result is indeterminate based on the
current rules and frameworks available, and thus more certainty is de-
sirable. 2 o That is true for plaintiffs (who wish to know where to sue),
as well as for defendants (who wish to know where they might be
sued). In the section below, we attempt to provide that desired pre-
dictability by offering a series of proposals for addressing personal ju-
risdiction in cloud-computing disputes.
C. Solutions for Personal Jurisdiction in the Cloud
Before outlining what we propose to be workable solutions to the
cloud-computing conundrum in personal jurisdiction, it is important
to reiterate that our intent and goal is not to make something out of
nothing. In other words, we do not claim to take a situation where no
U.S. jurisdiction is proper-that is, a foreign defendant acting on a
foreign server steals a foreign plaintiffs account information that
draws funds from a foreign bank-and provide a panacea to magically
land the defendant in a U.S. court. Rather, we assume that jurisdic-
tion is proper based on some U.S. contacts and that some forums are
more favorable for a plaintiff than others. That is to say that we are
concerned less with the result than with the process.
Applying this principle to the hypothetical discussed above, it is
not our contention that the plaintiff, X, will not be able to overcome a
motion to dismiss filed by the data thief. Indeed, a court in New York
(X's state of residence and likely her first-choice forum) may very well
find that it can maintain an action for invasion of privacy without vio-
lating the Illinois data thief's due-process rights. But as discussed, the
Zippo continuum is nontransferable to the cloud-computing analysis
290. See supra Part III.C (advocating for predictability as a normative goal).
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because of its technology-specific nature,' and the Calder doctrine is
likewise troublesome due to its focus on a connection between the
plaintiff and defendant ex ante to the commission of the tort.29 2 While
this will provide the data thief with little refuge on the merits of a pri-
vacy-invasion claim, it does have some teeth at the dismissal phase of a
lawsuit.
Taking these considerations into account, below are three
frameworks for bringing certainty and predictability to personal-
jurisdiction issues in cloud-computing disputes.
1. Caveat Maleficus Approach
One solution to the cloud-computing conundrum in personal ju-
risdiction is a caveat maleficus, or "wrongdoer beware," approach. This
proposal perhaps best analogizes to the age-old "thin-skull" doctrine
in tort law that is based on the principle that "you take your plaintiff
as you find him." In the cloud, however, the saying might be aptly
altered to be, 'You take your plaintiff where you find him."
Because tortfeasors in the cloud often inflict harm on "faceless"
plaintiffs, courts may run into trouble when dealing with jurisdic-
tional issues. This is because it would be a stretch to say that a de-
fendant "purposely availed" herself to a state's jurisdiction or "ex-
pressly aimed" her actions at a particular plaintiff in a given state
when the tortfeasor was ex ante blind to the victim of her tort.299 Even
state long-arm statutes that provide for jurisdiction over foreign de-
291. See supra Part IV.A.1.
292. See supra Part IV.A.2.
293. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891) ("[T]he wrongdoer is liable
for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not
have been foreseen by him."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 ("The negligent
actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other
which is neither known nor should be known to the actor makes the injury greater than
that which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen as a probable result of his
conduct.").
294. As in the hypothetical above, where a data thief could have used a random-
number generator or computer algorithm to obtain Xs credit-card information and had
no knowledge of who Xwas, Xis considered to be a faceless plaintiff.
295. SeeJenny L. Grantz, A Culture Without Consequences? Redefining Purposeful Availment
for Wrongful Online Conduct, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1146 (2012) (noting that "most courts
will not exercise jurisdiction unless the defendant was aware of the plaintiffs geographical
location").
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fendants may not be tailored to account for cloud torts performed on
data that is located at a remote server.9
A solution to the conflict between logical locations for bringing
suit and the constitutional barriers to doing so is for courts to adopt a
caveat maleficus approach. Under this theory, jurisdiction would au-
tomatically-and only as a balancing mechanism-be proper in the
plaintiffs place of residence. While this proposal might appear rigid
and overly plaintiff-friendly, the very nature of torts in the cloud war-
rants its perceived harshness to defendants. Cloud torts that involve
the hacking of remote servers to obtain information are complex and
sophisticated. In other words, there are high intellectual barriers to
entry for the illicit activities that occur in the cloud, and tortfeasors
296. For example, New York's long-arm statute provides for:
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an
agent: 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply
goods or services in the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the state, except
as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or 3.
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising
from the act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably
expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce; or 4. owns, uses or possesses any real
property situated within the state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (2003). We can immediately eliminate the "transacts any business" and
"owns, uses, or possesses any real property" options. We can also comfortably eliminate
the "commits a tortious act within the state" option. The tort (in the hypothetical) occurs
at the remote server where person Xs information is actually stolen. Cf Michael E.
O'Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 245 (2000) ("The computer
as the subject of a crime means that the computer is 'the physical site of the crime, or the
source of, or reason for, unique forms of asset loss."' (quoting LauraJ. Nicholson et al.,
Comment, Computer Crimes, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 207, 211 (2000))). Query how privacy
could be invaded in a jurisdiction where the tortfeasor never enters-physically or other-
wise-that jurisdiction. Arguably, however, the data thief virtually "enters" the remote
cloud server at its location in the Caribbean Sea. That leaves us then with "commits a tor-
tious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state." The sto-
len property (the money from Xs bank account) is not "in" New York, however-it is in
either North Carolina or Delaware, where the bank is located. The question before us,
then, becomes whether the injury to X is commensurate with her residence, or with her
person. In other words, if Xwere on vacation in Virginia when the data thief hacked into
the server and obtained her credit card information, would the tort then effectively occur
in Virginia, as opposed to New York? Certainly, X did not travel to Virginia and leave her
privacy right behind in New York.
297. Neal K. Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1075 (2001)
(noting that "[c]ybercrime is ... somewhat different from regular crime in that it initially
requires sophistication and expertise").
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know and understand, technologically, what it is that they are doing
when they access a server. Suffice to say, this sort of cloud tort is a
very intentional tort (at least in suits not against a provider, for exam-
ple in a lawsuit for negligent server security).
Accordingly, when a cloud tortfeasor implements a computer al-
gorithm or runs a random number generator to obtain the credit-
card information or social security number of a random person in a
database, it should come as no surprise to the tortfeasor that her vic-
tim is located in what would appear to be a random jurisdiction, that
is, not the tortfeasor's own state of residence. To be sure, the very na-
ture of the tort and level of sophistication required to commit it com-
pels a quasi quid pro quo-where a tortfeasor indiscriminately targets
a victim, justice requires the tortfeasor to defend a lawsuit in the vic-
tim's equally "indiscriminate" home state.
The caveat maleficus approach thus serves a three-fold purpose.
First, it may deter defendants from committing a cloud tort if they
know that they will have to "take their plaintiff where they find him."298
Second, and as a corollary, it effectively eliminates a defendant's con-
stitutional argument that she did not aim her actions at a given juris-
diction. In other words, the "faceless" plaintiff is a double-edged
sword for defendants-a defendant's lack of knowledge about her
plaintiff, it could be argued, imparts upon the defendant the aware-
ness that she could be haled into court anywhere, and in essence aims
her actions everywhere.29 9 Finally, the caveat maleficus approach serves
the benefit of giving end users a greater proclivity to interact with
software and programs in the cloud knowing that they have recourse
for violations of their cloud privacy through their own local consum-
298. See Daniel W. Shuman, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 118-32 (1993) (advocating for de-
terrence as a goal of tort law); see also generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (same).
299. See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (E.D. Va. 2002)
("Defendants allegedly purposefully transmitted millions of UBE to Verizon's e-mail serv-
ers. They cannot seek to escape answering for these actions by simply pleading ignorance
as to where these se[r]vers were physically located."); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Inter-
net, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 834 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) ("[Defendant] cannot plead lack of
purposeful availment because the 'nature' of the Internet does not allow it to know the
geographic location of its email recipients."); see also Grantz, supra note 295, at 1152-56
(discussing cases where the defendant was unaware of the plaintiff's location but was nev-
ertheless subject to jurisdiction).
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er-protection laws, as opposed to those laws of a foreign jurisdiction
(whether national or international).son
2. The Cloud as Its Own Jurisdiction
A second possible solution for resolving the cloud-computing
conundrum in personal jurisdiction is to simply rise above the world
below and create a new jurisdiction for torts and crimes that occur in
the cloud. That is, we could consider the cloud as a separate and dis-
tinct jurisdiction of its own, free of physical geographic boundaries.
This structure might take a form analogous to that of the Court of
Federal Claims, which is the exclusive court for, inter alia, patent-
infringement lawsuits against the government, and similarly, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is the exclusive juris-
diction for all patent-related appeals."o' Indeed, a similar scheme for
handling disputes regarding the Internet was previously advocated by
David Johnson, Co-Director of the Cyberspace Law Institute, and Pro-
fessor David Post.302
In their 1996 article discussing law in cyberspace, Johnson and
Post argue that "[t]reating Cyberspace as a separate 'space' to which
distinct laws apply should come naturally,... [because] the line that
separates online transactions from our dealings in the real world is
just as distinct as the physical boundaries between our territorial gov-
ernments.",,' Additionally, because the Internet is accessible globally,
Johnson and Post urge that "[c]onceiving of the Net as a separate
place for purposes of legal analysis will have great simplifying ef-
fects." 0 4 Moreover, a special jurisdiction for the Internet would put
an end to local jurisdictions engaging in what the authors refer to as
an "illegitimate extra-territorial power grab."3 00
There is, perhaps, an even stronger argument that this proposal
should gain traction for cloud computing more so than it has for the
300. Cf Geist, supra note 255, at 1347 ("Consumers anxious to purchase online must
also balance the promise of unlimited choice, greater access to information, and a more
competitive global marketplace with the fact that they may not benefit from the security
normally afforded by local consumer protection laws.").
301. As to the Court of Federal Claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); as to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006).
302. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
303. Id. at 1379.
304. Id. at 1380.
305. Id. at 1380.
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Internet.30 o That is because unlike Internet torts, cloud torts do not
necessarily have a nexus to any physical location (even if cloud servers
do). Whether a court is addressing a defamation or trademark in-
fringement claim, for example, Internet causes of action stem from
effects that are felt in one or multiple geographic jurisdictions. The
Internet is thus merely a medium through which a tort is committed. 0o
The cloud, on the other hand, is a "location" itself where a tort is
committed.as For example, copyrighted information can be accessed
and replicated in the cloud, and the infringement occurs regardless
of whether the copyright owner in a specific geographic jurisdiction
recognizes the infringement.
Accordingly, in much the same way that the complexities of pa-
tents gave birth to a specialized appeals courto30 a similar scheme may
be the answer to the complex jurisdictional fact patterns presented in
cloud disputes. This scheme might also provide the benefits of elimi-
nating forum shopping by plaintiffs as well as eliminating altogether
defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
3. Legislative Action and a Regulatory Scheme
Finally, updating current, or drafting entirely new, federal legis-
lation may provide at least a partial answer to the jurisdictional co-
nundrum. The Stored Communication Act ("SCA"), 1 o for example, is
the principal piece of legislation dealing with online privacy protec-
tions.3 1' As commentators have noted, however, "[w]hen Congress
306. See Rollo, supra note 155, at 693 (noting that "[t]o date, no court has adopted the
Cyberspace approach to the Internet.").
307. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 302, at 1378 ("Traditional legal doctrine treats the
Net as a mere transmission medium that facilitates the exchange of messages sent from
one legally significant geographical location to another, each of which has its own applica-
ble laws.").
308. See Couillard, supra note 84, at 2237-38 ("[T]he [cloud] service provider has a
copy of the keys to a user's cloud 'storage unit,' much like a landlord or storage locker
owner has keys to a tenant's space, a bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal
carrier has the keys to a mailbox.").
309. See Damon C. Andrews, Promoting the Progress: Three Decades of Patent Jurisprudence in
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 Mo. L. REV. 839, 840-41 (2011) (noting the
problems among regional circuit courts and at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that
spurred Congress to create the Federal Circuit).
310. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-11 (2006)).
311. Robison, supra note 5, at 1196; see also Nathaniel Gleicher, Neither a Customer Nor a
Subscriber Be: Regulating the Release of User Information on the World Wide Web, 118 YALE L.J.
1945, 1945 (2009) ("Without the SCA to balance the interests of users, law enforcement,
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enacted this legislation in 1986, it likely never contemplated anything
akin to modern cloud computing,"3 12 and Congress "has not amended
[the SCA] to address cloud computing. " It is, therefore, time for
comprehensive federal legislation that may solve the issue of where
jurisdiction is proper in the cloud.
The legislation that we propose would not itself designate the fo-
rum for bringing a lawsuit. Rather, these new laws should better de-
fine the types of crimes and torts being committed in the cloud so as
to nudge a plaintiff toward a particular forum. Because questions re-
garding the actual location of a wrongful act tend to arise when deal-
314
ing with complex cloud torts, a regulatory scheme tailored specifi-
cally to cloud computing would provide courts with clarity and
guidance on what tort is being committed-or in the case of a lawsuit
by a consumer against a service provider, a contract breach-and
thus, where the tort (or breach) is being committed. Accordingly, ra-
ther than relying on generic claims such as "invasion of privacy" or
"infringement," courts would be provided with a framework for de-
termining where the wrongful acts occurred based on the plain text
of statutes.
Similar legislative overhauls can be seen in the Digital Millenni-
um Copyright Act ("DMCA") "' and the Communications Decency Act
("CDA"), 1 6 which were enacted in response to changes in technolo-
gy. Both contain provisions that recognize the need for a balanced
and private industry, communications will be subjected to a tug-of-war between the private
companies that transmit them and the government agencies that seek to access them. In-
ternet users will find themselves with little protection.")
312. Dystra & Riehl, supra note 17, at 11.
313. Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
617, 645 (2011).
314. See supra note 296 (discussing New York's long-arm statute and the questionable
jurisdiction in New York).
315. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 512, 1201-05, 1301-32; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006)).
316. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 230, 560-61 (2006)).
317. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (1) (2006) ("The rapidly developing array of Internet and
other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an ex-
traordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our
citizens."); id. §(b) (1) ("It is the policy of the United States to promote the continued de-
velopment of the Internet... ."); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 680-81 (2000) ("The millennial hope underlying the
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approach that provides certainty to stakeholders. For example, "safe
harbor" provisions that protect service providers appear in both the
DMCA 18 and CDA. 11 Congress could similarly revise the SCA, or
draft entirely new comprehensive legislation, to provide increased
uniformity for establishing personal jurisdiction in the cloud. This
latter option would, however-like any attempt to create a legislative
magic bullet in the context of fast-moving and far-ranging innova-
tion-likely be fraught with difficulties. By way of analogy, the DMCA
as a whole has been roundly criticized by copyright scholars, yet its
safe-harbor provision has been largely heralded as a success. 20 Thus,
it would appear, at least at this early stage, that a more selective, tar-
geted approach is warranted.
V. CHOICE OF LAW IN THE CLOUD
Litigation arising out of the cloud will frequently present multi-
jurisdictional fact patterns. Workload migration3 2 ' and redundancy, 2 2
as well as location independence, tend to increase the geographic
scope of cloud-based interactions. Consequently, such litigation will
often raise complex choice-of-law questions.
En route to identifying a set of analytical guidelines for choice of
law in the cloud, we turn first to an examination of Internet choice-of-
law jurisprudence. Though the Internet and cloud computing are
imperfect analogs, the two do present some similarities. As with
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [was] to bring U.S. copyright law 'squarely into the digi-
tal age."' (internal footnotes omitted)).
318. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
319. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
320. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastruc-
ture, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 333 (2013) ("'[S]afe harbors' [] have shielded intermediaries
from secondary liability and thereby removed potential governmental and private con-
straints on the development of new Internet services.").
321. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
322. See TimothyJ. Calloway, Note, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation
on Liability Causes: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 163, 170 n.41 (2012) ("Most
Cloud services maintain data in up to three separate locations. This is an excellent redun-
dancy, should there be an [I]nternet outage or data center disaster. The data is readily
available from the other Cloud locations without an interruption in service.") (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
323. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Alberto G. Araiza, Note, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud, 2011 DUKE L. &
TECH. REv. 8, at *12 ("For example, the data in data centers may be subject to foreign laws
or no laws at all.").
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cloud-computing interactions, Internet-based interactions can involve
some sense of "location independence" and a broad-ranging geo-
graphic sphere of influence.' "Indeed, the Internet 'negates geome-
try .. . it is fundamentally and profoundly anti-spatial."'02 Like cloud
computing, the development and adoption of the Internet (1) intro-
duced an element of intangibility into human interactions and (2)
represents a technological paradigm shift that both informs, and is in-
formed by, globalization and the accompanying increase in cosmopol-
itanism. The similarities between the two allow lessons for the cloud
to be gleaned from an analysis of how choice-of-law principles have
evolved (or failed to evolve) to account for the advent of the Internet.
A. Lessons from Internet Choice-of-Law jurisprudence
A debate currently persists among legal scholars as to whether
the choice-of-law approaches outlined above*.. are sufficiently robust
to allow adjudication of cases involving Internet-based interactions.
On the one hand, the Internet clearly represents a dramatic shift in
the way humans interact with one another,2 and the contacts rele-
vant to the choice-of-law analyses that predated the Internet can be
much more geographically complex than those presented by real-
world interactions.3 o What is more, some scholars have pointed out
that the territorial-based conception of states and nation-states may
be quickly becoming archaic in an increasingly connected world,"
calling into question the validity of choice-of-law methodologies that
325. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59.
326. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
327. See supra Parts III.B.1-3.
328. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Internet Choice-of-Law Governance, Temple University Legal
Studies Research Paper Series No. 2012-20, at 4 (June 7, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2045070 ("The decision not to lead
choice-of-law students through a separate study of internet issues reflects the decision that
existing legal paradigms are sufficient to handle internet conflicts issues. This is not, how-
ever, the exclusive position among U.S. choice-of-law scholars.").
329. See supra Part II.B.
330. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 226, at 320 ("Indeed, even a cursory examination re-
veals that our current territorially based rules for jurisdiction (and conflict of laws) were
developed in an era when physical geography was more meaningful than it is today and
during a brief historical moment when the ideas of nation and state were being joined by a
hyphen to create an historically contingent Westphalian order.").
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were developed in the Pre-Network Era.32 Some-have gone so far as
to posit that "[n]o physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim
than any other to subject [Internet-based] events exclusively to its
laws." 33
Even in the face of these difficulties, however, "U.S. courts
have ... applied standard choice-of-law methodology-the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Governmental Interest Analysis,
and the like-in [I]nternet disputes involving multiple states of the
United States and foreign countries."04 Remaining is the question of
how they have done so-that is, the extent to and manner in which
courts have applied those standard methodologies in the context of
the Internet. The following Subparts explore three archetypal choice-
of-law decisions involving Internet contacts.
1. GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com35
The GlobalantaFe Corp. litigation involved a relatively "straight-
forward" set of facts (at least for an international conflict-of-laws
case) ." Two offshore drilling firms, Global Marine and Santa Fe, an-
nounced in September 2001 that they intended to merge into the
GlobalSantaFe Corporation.3 7 Within twenty-four hours, Jongsun Ha
Park, a Korean citizen, used a Korean registrar to register the Internet
domain name "globalsantafe.com.,"3 Park did not immediately post
any substantive content to the globalsantafe.com website, a fact that-
when coupled with the suspicious timing of the domain name regis-
tration-seemed to indicate that he intended to engage in "cyber-
squatting,"' a potential violation of U.S. law.34 Despite a final judg-
ment from a U.S. district court ordering the Korean registrar to
transfer the domain name to GlobalSantaFe, Park next obtained a
provisional injunction in a Korean court prohibiting the registrar
332. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Rede-
fining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2005) (applying a
"cosmopolitan pluralist" approach to Internet-based choice-of-law issues).
333. Johnson & Post, supra note 302, at 1376.
334. Little, supra note 328, at 4.
335. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
336. Id. at 612.
337. Id. at 612-13.
338. Id. Park then transferred ownership of the domain name to the Fanmore Corpo-
ration, a Korean firm. Id. at 613.
339. See Gatsik, supra note 240.
340. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (i)-(ii) (2006).
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from doing so on the theory that the U.S. district court lacked juris-
diction over the Korean registrar.' As a result, GlobalSantaFe re-
quested and obtained a second judgment from the U.S. district court
that again directed the transfer of the domain name.
The Globalsantafe Corp. opinions addressed questions of jurisdic-
tion and recognition of judgments rather than pure choice of law.
Viewed through those lenses, the U.S. court's decisions were fairly
straightforward applications of existing law-that is, of the law of the
United States. Having decided that jurisdiction lay in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, and that the U.S. Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act ("ACPA") 3 1 forbade the Korean parties' actions, all that
remained in the court's view was to ensure that comity concerns did
not require deference to the Korean court's order.3" Put simply, the
U.S. court skipped from the question of whether it could hear the
case to the question of whether the ACPA had been violated. The
choice-of-law question, that is, the question of whether the ACPA
ought to be the law that governed the parties' actions, was simply ig-
nored.
2. Mzamane v. Winftey 4 5
By her own estimation, in 2007, Oprah Winfrey was the third
most powerful media figure in the world (behind only Barack and
Michelle Obama) .3 Yet such power can be a double-edged sword.
The sphere of Oprah Winfrey's influence, coupled with the globalized
341. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
342. GlobalSantaFe also successfully directed VeriSign (the top-level domain name reg-
istry) to cancel the domain name until the Korean registrar transferred it to Global-
SantaFe. See id. at 614, 626-27.
343. Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a) (9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 (1999) (cod-
ified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8131).
344. See GlobatSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614 ("In addition to meeting these juris-
dictional requirements, GlobalSantaFe must also show ... that it is entitled to relief under
the ACPA,... and ... that concerns of international comity do not preclude such a reme-
dy in the face of the Korean court's injunction."). The U.S. court, applying U.S. law, held
that the "first-in-time" rule, along with the fact that the "Korean proceeding was obviously
begun with the intent of blocking the Judgment Order," did not require deference to
comity concerns. Id. at 624-25 (citing Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305
U.S. 456, 465-66 (1939)).
345. 693 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
346. Eamon McNiff, Judge Rules Oprah Winfrey Can Be Sued for Defamation, ABC NEWS,
Mar. 18, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/oprah-sued-defamation/
story?id=10127882.
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nature of Internet communications, led to a defamation suit being
filed against her in connection with alleged sexual abuses at a South
African school that she founded. When scandal erupted at the
Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for Girls ("Winfrey Academy") in
September 2007, Winfrey swiftly placed the headmistress of the
school, Lerato Nomvuyo Mzamane, on administrative leave. 4" Several
of Winfrey's subsequent statements to the press regarding the situa-
tion-which were ultimately disseminated globally via the Inter-
net"'-spurred Ms. Mzamane to sue Winfrey in Pennsylvania state
court.350
Mzamane v. Winfrey yielded a broad swath of geographic contacts.
The plaintiff, Mzamane, was born in Lesotho, matriculated in Nigeria,
Vermont, and New York, and had been employed in Pennsylvania for
the six years that preceded her one-year stint at the Winfrey Academy
in South Africa.35' The defendant, Winfrey, was at all times domiciled
in Illinois, and her allegedly defamatory statements were made in that
state.' Finally, as they had been published online, Winfrey's public
declarations reached nearly everywhere, including South Africa (the
locus of the scandal that prompted the statements)."
On these facts, the case presented a fairly knotty choice-of-law is-
sue. After Winfrey removed the case to federal court based on diversi-
ty jurisdiction, the court was bound to apply the choice-of-law meth-
odology of Pennsylvania (the state in which the court was located),
which had adopted the Second Restatement approach.5  The three
most connected jurisdictions were Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South
Africa. And while it is perhaps unsurprising that South African law
may have yielded a different outcome than U.S. law,355 even the choice
347. See Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65.
348. Id. at 464.
349. See id. at 471 ("Defendants concede, however, that the statements from the No-
vember Press Conference were available on the internet, and therefore, were published
throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania.").
350. See id. at 466. Winfrey subsequently removed the action to federal court based on
diversity of citizenship of the parties. Id.
351. Id. at 461-62.
352. Id. at 462.
353. Id. at 462, 471.
354. Id. at 469-71.
355. Id. at 473 (finding that a true conflict existed where South African law required
defendants to prove truth as a defense to a defamation claim, while Pennsylvania law re-
quired plaintiffs in such cases to prove falsity as part of their affirmative case).
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between Illinois and Pennsylvania laws could have been outcome-
determinative." Oddly, however, given its plaintiff-friendly nature,
"neither party raised the applicability of South African law to Plain-
tiff's claims. Rather, both parties argued vigorously against the appli-
cation of South African law to the instant dispute."5
An easy alternative had thus presented itself to the U.S. district
court: ignore the possibility that South African law ought to apply,
given that neither party had argued in favor of its application. What is
more, the court was under no duty to inquire, sua sponte, as to such a
possibility. 58  After concluding that Pennsylvania (the state of
Mzamane's domicile) had a stronger interest than Illinois in having its
law apply to the case, however, the court went on to examine in some
detail the question of whether South Africa's interest in protecting
Mzamane's reputation militated in favor of South African law apply-
ing.35 9 And though the court ultimately concluded that Pennsylvania's
law ought to apply, its decision was clear, its rationale transparent,
and its result relatively predictable.
3. CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton360
The Internet domain name "rl.com," registered in 1995 by Dale
Mayberry, proved valuable enough to incite multiple lawsuits, includ-
ing one brought by global clothing giant Ralph Lauren. Mayberry, a
Virginia resident, registered the name under a contract with a Dela-
ware registrar whose principal place of business was also in Virginia.6
Mayberry periodically renewed the domain-name registration, though
356. See Neil M. Rosenbaum, Pick a Court, Any Court: Forum ShoppingDefamation Claims in
the Internet Age, 14 J. INTERNET L. 18, 21 (2011) ("Illinois recognizes the 'innocent con-
struction rule' as a complete defense to claims for defamation per se whereas Pennsylvania
does not.").
357. Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
358. See FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1 ("A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign
country's law must give notice by a pleading or other writing."); Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d
at 468-69 ("While this rule empowers a district court with the authority to determine ap-
plicable foreign law, it imposes no obligation on the court to inquire into foreign law sua
sponte." (citing Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1999))).
359. Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 473-75 (examining the content of South African def-
amation law and the interests, as elucidated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
that it sought to further).
360. 600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010).
361. Id. at 1140.
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there was some dispute as to whether he subsequently "abandoned"
362
the registration by letting it expire.
In December 2003, a Beijing resident named Li Qiang gained
control of rl.com and transferred it to Barnali Kalita, a citizen of In-
dia.6 Subsequently, Kalita sold the name to John Laxton, a citizen of
California.6 Upon discovering that Laxton controlled rl.com, May-
berry filed a lawsuit in a federal district court in California, alleging
conversion, interference with contracts, and unfair competition.
The district court, having decided that the primary issue was one
of choice of law and that California law ought to apply, granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Mayberry on his conversion claims and or-
dered Laxton to turn over rl.com to Mayberry. 66 Laxton appealed to
the Ninth Circuit.6 7 On appeal, the primary issue was again choice of
law-Laxton (the California defendant) contended that Virginia law
ought to apply, while Mayberry (the Virginia plaintiff) argued in favor
of California law. 68
As the Ninth Circuit observed, " [t] his case requires application of
traditional choice-of-law . .. principles to an increasingly common fac-
tual setting, a dispute over the ownership of an Internet domain
name." 3  California had "specifically rejected" the First Restatement
approach in favor of "'governmental-interest' analysis," with the
"comparative impairment" method used to adjudicate true conflicts.370
Yet California also incorporated a strain of the lexfori methodology-
the court emphasized that "[a]s a default, the law of the forum state
will be invoked, and the burden is with the proponent of foreign law
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1140-41.
364. Id. at 1141.
365. See CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, No. C 06-7093 CW, 2008 WL 4427944, at *1-2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008) affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.
2010).
366. Id. at *8.
367. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1139-40.
368. Id. at 1141.
369. Id. at 1139.
370. Id. at 1141-42. The comparative-impairment solution to Currie's "true conflicts"
problem was developed by Professor William Baxter in the 1960s. See Baxter, supra note
182, at 8-9.
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to show that the foreign rule of decision will further the interests of
that state." 71
The first question to be resolved in governmental-interest analy-
sis-whether the potentially applicable laws actually differ 3 7 -posed
some difficulty. "Like the majority of states to have addressed the is-
sue, California law recognize [d] a property interest in domain
names,"373 which meant that domain names could be subject to con-
version under California law. The Virginia Supreme Court, on the
other hand, had held-albeit in the context of a garnishment case-
that domain names comprise contract (not property) rights.7 De-
spite this, the Ninth Circuit found that no conflict existed, resting its
reasoning on two grounds. First, given the "majority of states' justifia-
ble coalescence" around the property-rights rule, the court found it
reasonable to adopt a "narrow" reading of the Virginia Supreme
Court decision.3 7 ' And second, the fact that California treated do-
main names differently than other intangible property for purposes of
judgment debtor examinations allowed the "reasonable" inference
that Virginia "might" do the same.3 76 California's "default-to-forum"
rule thus dictated that California law ought to apply.3 77
Despite this holding, however, the court went on to address the
second step of interest analysis: whether (assuming a conflict exists),
the conflict is "true" or "false," a conflict being false where only one
jurisdiction has any real interest in having its laws apply to the facts at
hand.3 78 Here, the court characterized the Virginia interest as follows:
"Virginia is concerned with protecting Virginia residents who pur-
chase domain names from property claims, not from asserting property
371. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d
666, 670 (Cal. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
372. Id. (citing Abogados v. AT & T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2000)).
373. Id. at 1142.
374. See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 88 (Va. 2000) (find-
ing that, in the context of a garnishment case, domain names are governed by contract
law).
375. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1143.
376. Id.
377. See id. ("Under California choice-of-law rules, the party seeking application of for-
eign law bears the burden to show that the law of a foreign state should apply. At the
point Laxton fails to make this showing, we default to forum (California) law." (internal
citation omitted)).
378. See supra Part III.B.2; see also Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 253-55 (1958) (referring to "false prob-
lems").
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claims."39 California's interests, on the other hand, were painted with
broad strokes-"to protect the intangible property rights of the own-
ers of domain names,38s to reduce uncertainty and encourage in-
vestment, and to "promot[e] the overall growth of the Internet."0'1 In
sum, the Ninth Circuit found that "California's policy . .. is thus accu-
rately characterized as protecting the rightful holders of domain
names, [and] encouraging investment in and development of that
property."382 What is more, the court reasoned, "when the defendant
is a resident of California and the tortious conduct .. . occurs [in Cali-
fornia], California's deterrent policy of full compensation is clearly
advanced by application of its own law."3,1
Finally, the court concluded its choice-of-law analysis on an em-
phatic note:
Holding otherwise would encourage a race to the bottom,
allowing purchasers of potentially disputed domain names,
as well as cybersquatters, to reside or operate in states where
intangible property is provided little or no protection from
potentially tortious conversion. Such a situation could viti-
ate the intangible property rights of the true holders of such
property not-withstanding states' well-intentioned efforts to
protect these intellectual property interests.38
By delving into the qualitative "value" of the two jurisdictions' laws,
this parade-of-horribles argument employed a methodology akin to
the "better law" approach urged by Professor Leflar.
On four counts, the CRS Recovery, Inc. opinion demonstrates a lo-
cal-minded train of choice-of-law methodology and analysis referred
to as "parochialism."86 First, as a structural matter, the lexfo7i strain
contained within California's choice-of-law rules8 displays an obvious
379. CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1143.
380. Id. at 1144.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 666, 672 (Cal. 1974) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
384. Id.
385. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
386. Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369,
370 (2001). Emphasizing the problem of parochialism, Professor Reimann noted that pa-
rochialism was "amply confirmed by the Second Restatement[,] which all but ignores
comparative and international elements." Id. at 380.
387. See supra Part III.B.3.
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geographic self-favoritism. Of course, bound as it was to apply Cali-
fornia's chosen approach, the court can hardly be blamed for operat-
ing within such a structure. Yet the structure itself appears increasing-
ly outmoded in an era of globalization and digital connectivity, and
(as we argue infra) its shortcomings will be exacerbated should it
creep into the cloud."'
Second, the decision evidenced the opposite of the cultural rela-
tivism more appropriate to an increasingly cosmopolitan world and
the multistate and multinational fact patterns that have already begun
to emerge in cloud-based litigation. By presuming to determine the
content of foreign laws by reasoning that the foreign jurisdiction
would likely treat legal issues as the forum jurisdiction had done, the
CRS Recovery, Inc. court committed the error of judging another cul-
ture from within the confines of one's own local tradition. Granted,
the probability of "Type II" error3 9 from doing so was likely relatively
low where the two jurisdictions were both U.S. states. But where the
foreign jurisdiction is a foreign nation, and particularly a non-
Western nation, the likelihood of such error would likely increase.
Third, in characterizing the relevant state interests as it did, the
court engaged in a parochialist sleight-of-hand. By defining the for-
eign jurisdiction's interests at a low level of abstraction-and assum-
ing the sole purpose of Virginia's treating domain name rights as con-
tract rights was to guard its own citizens against property claims-the
court essentially minimized the scope of relevant foreign interests.
And that, in turn, had the effect of favoring the application of local
(forum) law. Tellingly, the court also observed that California's full-
compensation rule would be furthered where the defendant was a
California resident.390 Thus, it reasoned that the forum jurisdiction
had an interest in compensating nonlocal plaintiffs-yet the court had
already characterized Virginia's interest as protecting only Virginia
(i.e., local) residents."' Ascribing a nonlocalized interest to the forum
state, but a merely local interest to the foreign state, had the perverse
consequence of further favoring local law.
388. See infra Part V.A.2.
389. A "Type II error" consists of failing to reject a false null hypothesis. In this con-
text, the court's null hypothesis was that foreign law was structured similarly to local law;
thus, a Type II error would arise if the foreign law was in fact structured differently from
local law, but the court proceeded as if the two were the same.
390. CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010).
391. Id. at 1143-44.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit's parade-of-horribles argument, though
based on a putatively qualitative analysis of the conflicting laws, exhib-
ited a logical and parochialist fallacy. The argument centered on the
potentiality of cybersquatters locating themselves "in states where in-
tangible property is provided little or no protection from potentially
tortious conversion."" Assuming that domain names constitute "in-
tangible property," however, begged the question by assuming away
the unsettled inquiry at the very heart of the choice-of-law dispute-
namely, whether domain names comprise property rights or contract
rights. The argument is circular. And the circularity arose when the
court implicitly (and parochially) assumed that California (local) law
governed in the first instance. Again, the effect of addressing the
choice-of-law issue from within a framework that took for granted the
applicability (and superiority) of local law was-unsurprisingly-to fa-
vor local law and interests over those of the foreign jurisdiction.
4. Conclusions
The preceding sections suggest that Internet choice-of-law juris-
prudence has developed in scattershot fashion. Methodologies, ap-
plication, and the scope and breadth of analyses have varied widely.
The three cases discussed above construct a spectrum-from Global-
SantaFe, with its glaring lack of analysis; to Mzamane, a relatively well-
reasoned and balanced opinion; to CRS Recovery, Inc., with its various
shades of parochialism and xenophobia.
Unfortunately, to the extent scholars have identified any broader
trends within this sphere, the tendency appears to be toward either
simply ignoring choice-of-law questions or engaging in (at best) su-
perficial inquiries."' The portrait drawn is one of a "curious tendency
in [I] nternet cases: even though the disputes invariably possess signif-
icant multi-jurisdictional elements, courts often do not bother with
traditional choice-of-law analysis."9 Put simply, courts have tended to
392. Id. at 1144.
393. See e.g., Berman, supra note 332, at 1823 ("[S]imply because U.S. law may apply,
the judges seem to assume that U.S. law should apply, even without any sustained discus-
sion of other possible outcomes. At most, there is some consideration of comity."); An-
drea Slane, Tales, Techs, and Tenitories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the Legal
Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 129, 130 (2008)
("[C]ourts in Internet cases almost always confine conflicts issues to the exercise of...
personal jurisdiction ... [and] virtually never engage in a full conflicts analysis").
394. Little, supra note 328, at 7.
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ask only whether local law may apply, not whether it should apply."115
This is the approach exemplified by GlobalSantaFe, on the far end of-
or, arguably, even off-the choice-of-law spectrum.
Even when courts have engaged in more extended discussions of
choice-of-law questions in the online context, they often display sur-
prisingly "regressive" attitudes.9 As the CRS Recovery, Inc. opinion
amply demonstrates, opportunities to favor local interests over foreign
ones abound within modern choice-of-law methodologies. And this is
true even within analytical structures that do not overtly tilt in favor of
local interests; the lexfori approach (and its lesser strains that surface
in, for example, California's nominally interest-analysis based sys-
tem 3) is more obviously parochial.
All of this is still more surprising-and disturbing-given the
context in which this jurisprudence is occurring. The Internet has it-
self been a disruptive technology, allowing instantaneous bridging be-
tween geographic areas once considered so remote as to be almost
entirely unconnected." What is more, both exogenously and endog-
enously to the rise of the Internet, the world has become an increas-
ingly globalized, cosmopolitan place. 400 These developments require
contemporary institutions and individuals to confront a thorny, and
somewhat paradoxical, question: How can political, social, legal, and
economic cross-border integration be accomplished while also re-
specting myriad unique cultural structures and identities?401
There may well be no single, overarching answer to this question,
and it is certainly not our aim to attempt to provide one here-not
even one that could be compressed to fit the relatively narrow con-
tours of choice of law in the cloud. At a bare minimum, it should
provoke little or no disagreement to declare that the parochial ap-
proaches and artifices described above represent an inappropriately
395. Id.
396. See supra Part V.A. 1.
397. See Little, supra note 328, at 7 (observing that "unilateral analysis continues to have
a remarkably strong presence in choice-of-law cases").
398. CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010); see also supra Part
III.B.3 (discussing lexfon).
399. See supra Part II.B.
400. For one of the most prominent discussions of contemporary globalization, see
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OuvE TREE (1999).
401. Identifying this struggle could be said to be the central thesis of Friedman's work.
See, e.g., id. at 327-64 (describing the "backlash" against and the "groundswell" in favor of
globalization).
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narrow-minded solution. Beyond that, the normative goals identified
in Part III.C can serve as touchstones. Thus, with reference to fur-
thering those aims (and avoiding the repetition of past mistakes), we
ultimately seek to identify not a single "magic bullet," but rather pa-
rameters to help steer future choice-of-law analyses.
B. Analytical Guidelines for Choice of Law in the Cloud
By applying the lessons to be learned from over a decade of In-
ternet-based choice-of-law jurisprudence to the analogous cloud com-
puting context, this Subpart provides a set of guideposts to inform fu-
ture jurisprudence and scholarship. Again, these comprise no
panacea. Presently unforeseeable problems will undoubtedly arise as
the digital world shifts increasingly into the cloud. The principles en-
compassed in the following discussion, however, may ease the transi-
tion and allow the course of the law to avoid repeating the mistakes of
the past.
1. Confronting Conflicts: The Pitfalls of the 'juisdiction-Only"
Solution
None of the normative goals identified in Part III.C can be served
by simply ignoring choice-of-law questions. Yet, as seen in the Inter-
net context, courts confronted with complex, novel issues appear fre-
quently to do just that.402 If the choice-of-law inquiry holds any value
at all-and nearly two centuries of jurisprudence, civil law, and schol-
arship suggest that it does-then courts considering choice of law in
litigation arising out of the cloud ought not follow this route, tempt-
ing though it may be. Simply asking whether local law can apply is not
enough, particularly given the increasingly national and international
nature of cloud computing. Courts must "confront, instead of
gloss [ing] over, the apparent conflict in values and acknowledge that
a choice must be made and justified."403
What we refer to as the "jurisdiction-only" approach may be
"predictable" in the sense that, once a complaint has been filed, par-
ties are able to predict which law will apply ex post to their interactions
(at least in cases where jurisdiction lies in the plaintiffs chosen fo-
rum). But it is not predictable in the ex ante sense, i.e., private parties
402. Cf generally GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.Com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D.
Va. 2003); see also supra Part V.A. 1.
403. Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as Fact and Aid
to the Pursuit ofjustice, 90 B.U. L. REV. 903, 913 (2010).
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cannot ex ante predict what set of laws will likely apply to their ac-
tions-and it is this latter sense of predictability that produces the ef-
ficiencies sought by modern choice-of-law rules. Furthermore, this
jurisdiction-only style of choice-of-law methodology-or, perhaps
more accurately, lack of methodology-is clearly neither an open nor
transparent mode of analysis. And finally, it lacks objectivity, for it
unduly favors plaintiffs by essentially allowing them to choose which
(presumably plaintiff-friendly) law ought to apply by engaging in fo-
rum shopping. To the extent that plaintiffs tend to file lawsuits in
their local jurisdiction, this approach also functions in an unnecessari-
ly parochial manner.
By reducing trust, signaling a xenophobic mindset, and increas-
ing uncertainty, each of these facets of the jurisdiction-only approach
fail to further-and actually undermine-the prosocial adoption of
innovative cloud-computing processes. Again, courts in this context
should not ask only whether forum law may apply, but should go on
to ask whether local law ought to apply, keeping the traditional aims of
choice-of-law rules-as well as the unique goals noted above-firmly
in mind.
2. Leaving Lex Fori Behind
Like the jurisdiction-only approach, the lex fori methodology is
particularly unsuited to resolving cloud-based choice-of-law questions
while also serving normative ends. It is, to be sure, simple to apply-a
feature that may explain its continued, albeit limited, use.404 Func-
tionally, however, it is indistinguishable from a jurisdiction-only sys-
tem: courts first analyze the question ofjurisdiction, then simply apply
local law. It could be argued that lex fon does possess one advantage
over the jurisdiction-only approach in that it is quite transparent, that
is, lexfoni courts openly favor local law over foreign law. The expres-
sive function of law, however-the reality that law affects social inter-
actions not only by what it does, but by what it "says"40'-causes this
"advantage" to cut both ways. By openly declaring parochial values,
lexfofi communicates a narrow-minded worldview even more effective-
404. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing the lexfori approach).
405. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1504 (2000) ("At the most general level, expressive
theories tell actors-whether individuals, associations, or the State-to act in ways that ex-
press appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values."); see also Richard H. McAd-
ams, An Attitudinal Theory ofExpressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000).
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ly than jurisdiction-only decisions. As a result, it may have the ironic
effect of disadvantaging local institutions and individuals by discour-
aging cross-border transactions and interactions that would benefit
both, or all, parties involved, including local ones. And aside from
the transparency question, lexfori is deficient in the cloud context for
the same reasons as the jurisdiction-only methodology.
3. Cultural Relativism and the Content ofForeign Law
Courts using one of the more process-based choice-of-law ap-
proaches-governmental interest analysis and its offshoots, better law,
or (to an arguably lesser extent) the Second Restatement-necessarily
engage in substantive and comparative analyses of forum law and the
laws of one or more foreign jurisdictions. When doing so in the con-
text of cloud-based litigation, a paradigm of cultural relativism should
inform their decisions.0
"Cultural relativism," a concept that arose first in the field of an-
thropology, describes the concept "that civilization is not something
absolute, but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are
true only so far as our civilization goes., 40' Facilitating trust and re-
ducing uncertainty in cross-border interactions requires a cultural-
relativist framework, given that "moral rules and social institutions ev-
idence an astonishing cultural and historical variability., 40 In light of
this, courts should not be confident that they can accurately assess the
contours of foreign law by referring to the content of local law. And
as a result, should the parochial approach to deciphering foreign law
described above become one used in multijurisdictional, cloud-based
litigation, foreign parties will necessarily face more ex ante uncertainty
when ordering their interactions with local parties. Furthermore, by
communicating that local law provides the touchstone for analyzing
the content of foreign law, this attitude (like lexfori) expresses a paro-
chial message that may ultimately hinder the spread of innovation.
Instead, courts ought to refer to foreign codes, common law, and
regulations-not local law-when attempting to discern the content
of foreign law.
406. The type of cultural relativism we are referring to should be distinguished from
the "radical cultural relativism" school of thought, which holds that "culture is the sole
source of the validity of a moral right or rule." Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Uni-
versal Human Rights, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 400, 400 (1984).
407. Franz Boas, Museums of Ethnology and Their Classification, 9 SCIENCE 587, 589
(1887).
408. Donnelly, supra note 406.
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4. Ceteris Paribus Levels of Abstraction for Governmental Interests
Choice-of-law rules that require characterization of governmental
interests, as seen above, present an opportunity for more subtle paro-
chialism. Thus, careful ceteris paibus abstraction should become the
norm in interest-centric choice-of-law analyses. "Ceterisparibus," a Lat-
in phrase attributed to British economist Alfred Marshall and fre-
quently translated as "all other things being equal," is often used in
economics literature to describe a relationship between two variables
while holding all other possibly confounding variables constant." We
use it here to describe the manner in which courts ought to compare
governmental interests in deciding choice-of-law issues-the two in-
terests ought to be compared "holding all else constant," particularly
the levels of abstraction used to define the relevant interests. Doing
so will foster transparency, predictability, objectivity, and innovation.
The problem of defining one set of interests at a low level of ab-
straction while defining a more favored set of interests at a high level
of abstraction is certainly not unique to the choice-of-law context.
Courts have repeatedly engaged in this practice.10 In a pair of factu-
ally similar freedom-of-religion cases, for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court defined the relevant governmental interests at very different
levels of abstraction-yielding an outcome of unconstitutionality in
one case and of constitutionality in the other.' More recently, CRS
Recovery, Inc. demonstrates the presence of this type of outcome-
determinative abstracting in Internet-based choice-of-law disputes, as
well as the possibility that it could bleed into cloud-based litigation.
Defining foreign jurisdictions' interests at a lower level of ab-
straction than forum interests,4 12 or defining forum but not foreign
409. E.g., Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
363, 364-67 (1998).
410. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. .
943, 973 (1987) ("The problem for constitutional balancing is the derivation of the scale
needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency for comparison.");
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 40 (1994) ("Many social goals appear 'compelling' when
they are inflated to the highest level of generality: that is, if the question is whether the law
will be undermined in its application to society as a whole.").
411. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RPFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 82-83 (1996) (comparing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), to United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
412. See, e.g., CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 2010)
(discussing the foreign jurisdiction's interest as a narrow interest, while discussing the fo-
rum interests broadly).
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law as encompassing nonlocal goals,1 is neither open nor transpar-
ent. Instead, by purporting to engage in a side-by-side, fair balancing
of competing laws and interests, yet disproportionately favoring local
law, outcome-determinative abstraction functions in a misleading,
opaque manner. Furthermore, this methodology yields outcomes
that are frequently at odds with the outcome that would be expected,
given the stated choice-of-law rules. It thus hinders predictability. Fi-
nally, placing a finger on the scale in favor of local law both precludes
objectivity and communicates parochial values. The cumulative result
of these effects would be to chill the dissemination and adoption of
innovative cloud processes.
5. Cosmopolitanism and Circularity in Qualitative Comparisons
In jurisdictions that overtly apply the "better law" approach (as
well as in jurisdictions wherein courts nominally apply other rules
while using a similar normative judgment as a "tiebreaker" or to but-
tress their conclusions), special care will be required in addressing
cloud-based choice-of-law questions. Choice of law necessarily recog-
nizes that " [t] here is no 'view from nowhere' that can be used to cap-
ture the legal essence of the institution or conflict in question."4 14 In-
stead, courts must analyze the relevant legal structures as laterally and
discretely situated, yet concurrently intertwined with the facts at hand.
To avoid blatant parochialism, courts engaging in a better-law judg-
ment must avoid begging the question by consciously or unconscious-
ly analyzing the qualitative merits of foreign law from the perspective
411
of a world in which local law already governs.
Here, cultural relativist-and, to some extent, feminist-critiques
again offer valuable insight: courts ought to be wary of reflexive atti-
tudes regarding the "other" or "immediate instincts about the cultural
and legal facts."4 1 The risk of failing to do so is especially acute where
a foreign legal structure is based in part on a U.S. model, which may
lull courts into a false sense of confidence as to their understanding
413. E.g., id.
414. Karen Knop et al., From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Con-
flict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REv. 589, 634 (2012).
415. This, of course, is the misstep the Ninth Circuit made in CRS Recovery, Inc. See su-
pra Part V.A.3.
416. Knop et al., supra note 414, at 634.
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of the foreign law.417 This form of question-begging yields outcomes
that lack objectivity, express unseemly favoritism of local law as a re-
sult, and are unpredictable from foreign parties' perspective. In sum,
courts adjudicating choice-of-law issues in the cloud context would do
well to adopt a more cosmopolitan approach that recognizes the lat-
eral nature of local and foreign laws."
VI. CONCLUSION
Society is well on its way toward ubiquitous deployment and
adoption of cloud computing. The legal field, however, currently lags
behind these developments. Unwieldy at best and unworkable at
times, the current theories and rules governing jurisdictional and
choice-of-law analyses are in dire need of updating. While no single
policy proposal could hope to serve as a panacea for each problem
courts will face in this context, a careful selection and application of
the principles and reforms outlined above may help to avoid many of
the mistakes made in the earlier environment of the Internet. Even
more importantly, the selected principles will guide the continued
development of jurisdiction and choice of law in the cloud so as to
promote the predictability, trust, and mutual respect that are essential
to ensuring the continued spread of innovation.
417. Maureen B. Callahan, Cultural Relativism and the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts,
30 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 609, 609 (1994).
418. Cf Berman, supra note 332, at 1821-23 (arguing for increased cosmopolitanism in
the Internet context).
[VOL. 73.31388
